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Prosecutors' Use of Inconsistent
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ON THE EVENING of September 11, 1981, Ginger Fleischli went to
a bar with a group that included David Leitch, her roommate and
sometime lover until the previous month, and Thomas Thompson,
Leitch's current roommate.1 Around 1:00 a.m., Fleischli went with
Thompson and a third person to the Leitch/Thompson apartment,
and sometime after 2:00 a.m., the third person left.2 Two days later,
Fleischli's body was found in a field ten miles from the apartment.3
Thompson and Leitch subsequently were charged with rape and mur-
der and the prosecution sought the death penalty on the theory that
the killing occurred in conjunction with the rape. 4 At the preliminary
hearing, the prosecutor called four jailhouse informants ("Leitch in-
formants") who all claimed to have heard Thompson confess that
"Leitch wanted Fleischli dead for interfering with his attempts to rec-
oncile with his wife . . .and, therefore, had recruited Thompson to
* Philip and Muriel Barnett Professor of Trial Advocacy, University of San Francisco
School of Law. J.D. 1969, Harvard; A.B. 1966, University of California, Berkeley. Professor
Shatz was co-counsel for Teddy Brian Sanchez, who is presently on death row, on his
automatic appeal and petition for habeas corpus in the California Supreme Court. See
People v. Sanchez, 906 P.2d 1129 (Cal. 1995); In re Sanchez, No. S049502 (Cal. Sup. Ct.
1997). Mr. Sanchez's case is one of those discussed in this article.
** J.D. 2002, University of San Francisco; B.A. 1995, Lewis & Clark College.
1. See Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 542 (1998).
2. See id.
3. See id. at 543.
4. See Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1055 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) rev'd on
other grounds, 523 U.S. 538 (1998).
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help him kill her."5 According to one of the informants, Thompson
said that he had engaged in consensual sex with Fleischli, and, when
Leitch returned home, they executed Leitch's plan.6
The cases were severed, and Orange County Deputy District At-
torney Michael Jacobs elected to try Thompson first. At Thompson's
trial, Jacobs did not call any of the Leitch informants. 7 Instead, he
produced two new informants ("Thompson informants"), who testi-
fied that Thompson had confessed to them that he had raped and
killed Fleischli before Leitch returned home and that Leitch had
merely helped Thompson dispose of the body.8 In his closing argu-
ment, Jacobs called the Thompson informants' testimony "dispositive"
and "very, very damaging," and he argued to the jury that the sole
motive for the killing was Thompson's desire to cover-up the rape and
that Thompson committed the murder alone:
[Thompson] was the only person in that apartment with Miss Fleis-
chli the night-at the time she was killed.
We have the evidence that establishes Mr. Thompson alone in an
apartment with a girl who is raped and murdered.9
With regard to Leitch's role in the killing, Jacobs said:
The David Leitch involvement .... What evidence do we really
have that he did anything, had any part except that his car was
used to move the body and that his shoe print was at the scene?
There is no evidence we have putting him in the apartment that night. 10
Thompson was convicted and sentenced to death.11
At Leitch's trial, Jacobs reverted to the prosecution's theory from
the preliminary hearing-that Leitch masterminded the killing. Ja-
cobs did not call either of the Thompson informants, but instead
called on the defense witnesses from the Thompson case to testify about
"Leitch's violent disposition, Leitch's threats toward Fleischli, and
Leitch's motive to kill Fleischli."'12 To the Leitch jury, Jacobs argued
that Leitch was the only one with any motive for her death:
[Leitch's desire to reunite with his ex-wife is] really the only motive
we have in this case, and people have killed for less.
5. Id. at 1055.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 1056.
8. See id.
9. Id. at 1057 (alteration in original).
10. Id.
11. See Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 544 (1998).
12. Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1056.
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Leitch's was the only motive or reason for her demise.'"
In his argument to the jury, Jacobs ridiculed the very factual theory he
had used to put Thompson on death row:
The problem is, all of the evidence we have incriminates Mr. Leitch, at best,
equally, and more so than Mr. Thompson.
...Both men were together inside that apartment with Ginger
Fleischli.
So we have to ask ourselves, why would Mr. Thompson murder
Miss Fleischli alone in an apartment where he lived, with no trans-
portation, no means to move the body and wait for Mr. Leitch to
come home to be an A-1 witness for the murder of his ex-girl-
friend? Is that reasonable or logical? Do you think that's what
happened?
You think Mr. Thompson did this all by himself and waiting for this
good guy to come home so he could see him standing over his ex-
girlfriend, who he lived with ten days before? No, it didn't happen
that way. 14
Leitch was found guilty of second-degree murder.' 5
Thus, the prosecutor succeeded in placing Thompson on death
row and Leitch in prison, each on a version of the facts that he dis-
avowed in the other's case. When the case reached the Ninth Circuit,
the majority of the en banc court found the prosecutor's conduct to be
misconduct and a denial of due process. 16 Surprisingly, such
prosecutorial conduct has not been uncommon in California capital
cases. In at least five pairs of cases since the Thompson/Leitch cases,
California prosecutors have obtained death sentences by pursuing in-
consistent factual theories at separate murder trials of co-defend-
ants. 17 And, as in Thompson, the California Supreme Court has
13. Id. at 1056-57 (alteration in original).
14. Id. at 1057 (alteration in original).
15. See Calderon, 523 U.S. at 544.
16. See Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1057-59 (plurality opinion); id. at 1063 (Tashima, J.,
concurring). The court affirmed the district court's partial grant of habeas corpus on other
grounds: the ineffectiveness of Thompson's counsel. See id. at 1055. The Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit's decision, not on the merits, but on the ground that the en banc
court had abused its discretion in recalling the mandate that had issued after the panel's
decision. See Calderon, 523 U.S. at 542. Thompson was executed on July 14, 1998. The
sequence of events resulting in Thompson's execution is described and criticized by Judge
Stephen Reinhardt in The Anatomy of an Execution: Fairness vs. "Process," 74 N.Y.U. L. REv.
313 (1999).
17. The prosecutions were against: (1) Charles Huffman and Lee Farmer for commit-
ting a burglary murder, see People v. Farmer, 765 P.2d 940 (Cal. 1989); (2) Samuel Bonner
and Watson Allison for a robbery murder, see People v. Allison, 771 P.2d 1294 (Cal. 1989);
(3) Teague Scott and Melvin Turner for a double robbery murder, see People v. Turner,
878 P.2d 521 (Cal. 1989) and People v. Turner, 726 P.2d 102 (Cal. 1986); (4) Teddy
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rejected "inconsistent theories" challenges in each of the cases it has
decided."'
This article examines whether, and under what circumstances, a
death row defendant is entitled to relief as a result of the prosecutor's
use of inconsistent factual theories at the separate trials of the defen-
dant and a co-defendant.' 9 In Part I, we take a closer look at the Cali-
fornia cases raising the issue and describe the variables that might
affect whether relief is warranted; we explore why the use of inconsis-
tent factual theories is misconduct; and we review the treatment of the
issue in the California courts. In Part II, we analyze whether such mis-
conduct violates either the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment or the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishments. In Part III, we look at possible challenges to such mis-
conduct under state law. We conclude, in Part IV, that the prosecu-
tor's use of inconsistent factual theories to obtain a death judgment
can be challenged on both federal constitutional and state law
grounds and that the courts' failure to address the issue is an open
invitation to further abuse. 20
Sanchez and Robert Reyes for aiding and abetting in a double murder, see People v.
Sanchez, 906 P.2d 1129 (Cal. 1995); (5) Tauno Waidla and Peter Sakarias for a burglary/
robbery murder, see People v. Waidla, 996 P.2d 46 (Cal. 2000) and People v. Sakarias, 995
P.2d 152 (Cal. 2000). In the first four pairs of cases, only one of the defendants was sen-
tenced to death with the result that there is only one published opinion for each pair. In
the Waidla/Sakarias cases, both defendants were sentenced to death.
18. See discussion infra Part I.C.
19. The issue of the prosecutor's use of inconsistent theories can only arise when co-
defendants are tried separately, but separate trials are the rule rather than the exception in
capital cases. In a substantial number of capital cases, the prosecutor wants to introduce a
confession of one or more of the defendants, and, under the rule of Bruton v. United
States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968) and its California counterpart, People v. Aranda, 407 P.2d
265, 270 (Cal. 1965), the prosecutor cannot introduce such evidence at a joint trial if it
implicates the other defendant(s). See also Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 192-94 (1998)
(stating that because the use of an accomplice's confession "creates a special, and vital,
need for cross-examination," a prosecutor desiring to offer such evidence must comply
with Bruton, hold separate trials, use separate juries, or abandon the use of the confession).
In each of the six case pairs discussed in this article, the prosecutor introduced confessions
against one or both of the co-defendants. Separate trials also help to ensure that the
Eighth Amendment requirement-that the sentencing jury consider "the uniqueness of
the individual" to be sentenced, Lockett v. Ohio, 436 U.S. 586, 605 (1978)-is fulfilled.
20. Throughout this article, except when referring to actual prosecutors in specific
cases, we employ feminine pronouns when referring to the prosecutor. We do this, not
because most prosecutors (or most prosecutors using inconsistent theories) are women,
but because we want to avoid the awkwardness of using dual pronouns and to distinguish
the prosecutors from the defendants, who, in most death penalty cases and in all the cases
discussed in this article, are men.
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I. The Inconsistent Theories Problem
The conduct of the prosecutor in the Thompson/Leitch cases was
not only criticized by the judges of the Ninth Circuit; it also has been
roundly condemned by commentators. 21 However, is the presentation
of inconsistent factual theories in separate trials of co-defendants mis-
conduct?22 In order to answer that question, we first describe the vari-
ations in inconsistent theories cases as reflected in the six California
capital case pairs in which the issue has been raised. 23 We then ex-
amine the reasons for labeling such use of inconsistent factual theo-
ries as misconduct. Finally, we look at the California courts' treatment
of the issue.
21. See Anne Bowen Poulin, Prosecutorial Inconsistency, Estoppel, and Due Process: Making
the Prosecution Get Its Story Straight, 89 CAL. L. REv. 1423, 1466-67 (2001); Reinhardt, supra
note 16, at 322-26; Barry Tarlow, Limitations on the Prosecution's Ability to Make Inconsistent
Arguments in Successive Claims, 21 CHAMPION 40, 44-45 (1997).
22. The inconsistent theories problem considered here-the prosecutor's deliberate
attempt to obtain inconsistent verdicts-is not to be confused with the question whether
inconsistent verdicts themselves are subject to challenge. Despite the Supreme Court's ac-
knowledgment of the "scandal and inequity of inconsistent verdicts," Richardson v. Marsh,
481 U.S. 200, 210 (1987), the Court has long held that a defendant may not challenge a
verdict on the ground that the verdict was inconsistent with the factfinder's treatment of
other counts against the same defendant, see Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393
(1932), or that it was inconsistent with a verdict rendered against a co-defendant, see
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 279 (1943). The California Supreme Court has
adopted the same rule. See People v. Sanchez, 29 P.3d 209, 221 n.ll (Cal. 2001); People v.
Palmer, 15 P.3d 234, 236-38 (Cal. 2001).
23. The description of the Thompson/Leitch cases, see supra pp. 1-4, is drawn entirely
from published sources. The descriptions of the other five case pairs are drawn from the
published opinions of the California Supreme Court, see supra note 17, and the following
unpublished materials: as to the Huffman/Farmer cases, the briefs of the parties and unpub-
lished opinion of the court in Farmer v. Ratelle, No. 96-56489 (9th Cir. 1997); as to the
Bonner/Allison cases, the briefs of the parties in Allison's pending federal habeas corpus
case, Allison v. Woodford, No. CV 92-6404-CAS (C.D. Cal.) and the order of the court in In
re Allison, No. S042478 (Cal. Sup. Ct.); as to the Scott/Turner cases, the briefs of the parties
in Turner's pending federal habeas corpus case, Turner v. Woodford, No. CV 965-2844
(C.D. Cal.); as to the Sanchez/Ryes cases, the briefs of the parties in In re Sanchez, S049502
(Cal. Sup. Ct.) and the memoranda of the parties and transcript of proceedings on defen-
dant's Motion to Dismiss Special Circumstances (Collateral Estoppel) in People v. Reyes,
No. 34638 (Kern Co. Super. Ct.); as to the Waidla/Sakarias cases, the briefs of the parties in
Sakarias's pending state habeas corpus case, In re Sakarias, No. S082299 (Cal. Sup. Ct.). As
to each of these five case pairs, one or more counsel handling the case involving the death-
sentenced defendant confirmed the accuracy of the description. While citations are given
here only for direct quotes from unpublished materials, all materials from which the de-
scriptions are drawn are on file with the University of San Francisco Law Review.
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A. Variations on a Theme
The six California case pairs raising the inconsistent theories
problem all involve the prosecutor having argued inconsistently about
the role of the defendants in the murders. In four of the six case pairs,
the Thompson/Leitch, Bonner/Allison, Sanchez/Reyes, and Sakarias/Waidla
cases, the inconsistency was as to which of the two defendants was the
actual killer (or, in the Sanchez/Reyes cases, which was the actual aider
and abettor). In the other two case pairs, the Huffman/Farmer cases
and the Scott/ Turner cases, the prosecutors argued consistently as to
which of the pair was the actual killer, but their inconsistent argu-
ments as to the role played by the other defendant raised the question
whether the prosecutor even had correctly identified the actual killer.
Despite this common theme in the prosecutors' use of inconsistent
factual theories, the case pairs vary in three respects that could be
considered relevant to the question of whether the prosecutor en-
gaged in misconduct and whether the death row defendant is entitled
to any relief.
1. The Nature of the Inconsistency
As the six California case pairs reflect, there are three different
categories of inconsistent theories cases. In some cases, the prosecutor
presents substantially the same evidence at both trials but argues that
the factfinders should draw different inferences from the evidence
("inconsistency by inference"). In other cases, the prosecutor presents
different evidence in the two trials in one of two ways. In some cases
the prosecutor presents contradictory evidence in the two trials ("in-
consistency by commission"). In other cases, the prosecutor creates a
different evidentiary picture by presenting a less complete version at
one trial of the evidence presented at the other trial ("inconsistency
by omission"). 24
The Thompson/Leitch cases involved "inconsistency by commis-
sion": the prosecutor used different witnesses at each trial, and their
testimony was irreconcilable. 25 The Sanchez/Reyes cases constitute an-
24. Unlike the defendants in case pairs in the first two categories, the defendants in a
case pair where the prosecutor has created inconsistency by omission are not similarly
situated. The defendant tried on the more complete version of the facts-like the defen-
dant in a case of inconsistency by inference-can only challenge the prosecutor for mak-
ing inconsistent arguments, not for misuse of the evidence. The defendant tried on the less
complete version of the facts-like the defendant in a case of inconsistency by commis-
sion-can challenge not only the prosecutor's inconsistent argument, but also her failure
to present evidence favorable to the defendant at his trial.
25. See discussion supra pp. 1-3.
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other example of contradictory informants and inconsistency by com-
mission. Sanchez and Reyes were both charged with aiding Joey
Bocanegra in the double murder of his parents, and the prosecutor
sought the death penalty against both defendants. 26 Sanchez was tried
first. The prosecution evidence established that Joey Bocanegra had
stabbed both his parents a number of times and that the stabbing was
the sole cause of their deaths, and it also established that both parents
had been struck several times on the head by a bar or rebar. The evi-
dence linking Sanchez to the crime came from ajailhouse informant
who testified that Sanchez had confessed to him that he entered the
house when Bocanegra was fighting with his father and that he struck
the father on the head with a bar. The informant offered no testimony
concerning Reyes. In her closing argument, the prosecutor asserted
that there were only two people present and that, if Joey Bocanegra
was stabbing his parents, Sanchez must have been the one to strike all
the blows with the bar.
He chose to hit the old man, and he did.... There is no evidence
that there was anyone else other than Mrs. Bocanegra in the house.
27
In her rebuttal argument, the prosecutor, speaking of the killing of
the mother, made the same point.
I think it's quite clear that this crime was committed quite similarly
to that of Mr. Bocanegra, that is two people committing the crime.
And the idea that there was a third person in the house that might
have picked up this pipe or bar-there's no evidence there was a
third person in the house.
There was evidence of two different kind [sic] of shoe tracks.
There was evidence from Mr. Sanchez that Mr. Bocanegra was in
the house, but there's no other evidence of a third person to pick
up the bar.28
After obtaining murder convictions and a death sentence against
Sanchez, the prosecutor then proceeded to prosecute Reyes using a
different jailhouse informant. According to this informant, Reyes had
confessed to him that he (Reyes) was present at the Bocanegra
murders, and that when Joey Bocanegra started fighting with his fa-
ther, he (Reyes) hit the father a number of times with a piece of rebar
he was carrying and, subsequently, also hit the mother. When Reyes's
attorneys brought a pre-trial motion to challenge the prosecutor's use
26. The two defendants were also charged with an unrelated non-capital felony-mur-
der, see People v. Sanchez, 906 P.2d 1129, 1140-41 (Cal. 1995).
27. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 141, In re Sanchez, No. S049502 (Cal. Sup.
Ct.).
28. Id. at 142.
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of inconsistent theories, the prosecutor expressly stated that she be-
lieved the second informant was telling the truth, and she flatly as-
serted that there were three men in the house committing the crime.
Reyes ultimately pled guilty to the murders in exchange for life
sentences.
The Bonner/Allison cases and the Waidla/Sakarias cases involve in-
consistency by omission: the prosecutor created a different evidentiary
record in the second trial by failing to introduce evidence used in the
first trial. In the Bonner/Allison cases, the two defendants were charged
with a break-in robbery-murder and the prosecutor sought the death
penalty against both. Bonner was tried first, and the prosecutor's the-
ory was that Bonner and Allison had both entered the victim's apart-
ment and that Bonner had been the one to shoot the victim. In
support of this version of the facts, the prosecutor called a jailhouse
informant, who testified that Bonner confessed the entire crime to
him, including that Bonner had shot the victim. In his final argument,
the prosecutor said:
What evidence did I ask you to consider in putting the gun in the
hand of Samuel Bonner? His own words saying he did it. That is
not circumstantial evidence. It is direct evidence and an admission
of fact, if you believe it.
It is direct evidence of guilt, the admission of the person.
"I did it." It's not-doesn't require logical inference. That's there.
If you believe the statement by Samuel Bonner, "I did it," it directly
proves the fact that he is guilty of it. Therefore, no logical infer-
ence need (be] drawn, like a fingerprint means he touched
something.29
The jury convicted Bonner of first degree murder and special circum-
stances, but did not find true that he had personally used a firearm. At
that point, the prosecutor dropped his request for the death penalty
and proceeded to trial against Allison on the theory that Allison was
the actual killer and Bonner was nothing but a "wheelman" who never
entered the victim's apartment. At Allison's trial, the informant's testi-
mony was not introduced, and the prosecutor ridiculed Allison's de-
fense that Bonner was the actual killer:
The evidence all points to Allison is the one going in [sic], and all
the evidence that's reasonable and believable that you will look at
29. Notice of Motion and Motion for Evidentiary Hearing; Memorandum of Points
and Authorities at 23, Allison v. Calderon, No. CV 92-6404-CAS (C.D. Cal. June 23, 2000).
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shows Bonner drove the Ford all the time and was not the inside
man.
30
Why, all of a sudden, is Samuel Bonner the prime mover in the
crime when everything you have heard shows he is the wheelman,
just bringing the parties together. Why does Sam Bonner, which
[sic] the evidence shows is a relatively minor participant, based on
conduct observed by the innocent witnesses, citizen [sic] of the
neighborhood-why does the conduct of Samuel Bonner get
twisted around and all of a sudden it's Mr. Allison that's driving the
car away and it's Bonner inside doing everything?
31
Do you know why? Because that's the only way he can escape the
truth of the special circumstance that he intentionally killed the
victim.
3 2
Allison was convicted and sentenced to death.
In the Waidla/Sakarias cases, the pattern was similar, although
the missing evidence at the second trial was a portion of a medical
examiner's testimony, rather than the testimony of ajailhouse inform-
ant. The evidence was that Waidla and Sakarias participated in a mur-
der during the commission of a burglary and robbery. The victim was
attacked with a hatchet and a knife, and the fatal blow was struck with
a hatchet. Waidla was tried first, and the prosecutor's theory was that
Waidla planned the burglary and robbery, played the dominant role
in the crimes, and struck the fatal blow. The prosecutor's medical ex-
aminer testified that the victim had a post-mortem abrasion on her
back consistent with having been dragged from one room to another.
The prosecutor argued that Waidla wielded the hatchet and led the
attack on the victim in the living room and that Waidla struck her
until she was dead.
We know she was dead in the front room of her home in her living
room. We know she did not live to see or to be dragged back into
her bedroom .... At the point that she was dragged into the back
room, we know that [the victim] was already dead by the facts as
the coroner testified.3 3
Waidla was convicted and sentenced to death. At Sakarias' trial, the
prosecutor presented much the same evidence as was presented at
Waidla's trial, and, in addition, he introduced Sakarias' statements to
the effect that, at Waidla's command, he went back to the bedroom
and struck the victim twice with the hatchet. Although the medical
30. Petitioner's Reply to Respondent's Opposition to Motion for Evidentiary Hearing
and Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at 46, Allison v.
Woodford, No. CV 92-6404-CAS (C.D. Cal. June 1, 2001) (alteration in original).
31. Id. at 26.
32. Id. at 27-28.
33. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 53, In re Sakarias, No. S082299 (Cal. Sup.
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examiner testified as to the cause of death, the prosecutor failed to
elicit from him testimony about the abrasion. With no contrary testi-
mony in the record, the prosecutor argued that the victim was alive
when she was dragged to the bedroom, and that it was Sakarias who
had struck the victim with the hatchet "thus finally ending her life."
He concluded that there was "absolutely no evidence of domination"
on the part of Waidla and that Sakarias was "in every respect" Waidla's
partner.34 Sakarias was convicted and sentenced to death.
The Huffman/Farmer cases and the Scott/ Turner cases involved in-
consistency by inference. In the Huffman/Farmer cases, the evidence
was that Huffman and Farmer together committed a burglary of the
victim's apartment and that later the same night, after the victim re-
turned home from work, one or both of the defendants returned to
the apartment and committed the burglary-murder that resulted in
Farmer's death sentence. The prosecutor's circumstantial evidence in
the two cases tended to establish three facts: (1) Farmer reentered the
apartment and committed the murder (the victim identified the as-
sailant as a drug customer of the victim's roommate, and Farmer's
name and phone number were found on a list kept by the room-
mate); (2) Huffman reentered the apartment with Farmer and partici-
pated in the murder (the footprints of both men were found outside
the victim's window); and (3) only one person reentered the apart-
ment and committed the murder (the victim referred to only one in-
truder being in his apartment). All three of these "facts" could not
have been true. At Huffman's trial, the prosecutor's theory was that
facts #1 and #2 were true, that Farmer and Huffman together commit-
ted the murder, and that, if anything, the physical evidence (foot-
prints) more clearly established Huffman's guilt. Huffman was
acquitted of the burglary-murder. At Farmer's trial, the prosecutor's
theory was that facts #1 and #3 were true, and that Farmer committed
the murder acting alone. Farmer was convicted and sentenced to
death. 35
34. Id. at 52.
35. See People v. Farmer, 765 P. 2d 940, 948 (Cal. 1989) (reversing the penalty ver-
dict). If subsequent events are any measure, both of the prosecutor's theories were wrong.
At Farmer's penalty retrial, the defense introduced evidence that Huffman had confessed
to at least two people (one being Farmer's counsel) that he was the actual killer and had
acted alone. The jury sentenced Farmer to life imprisonment. Farmer then sought habeas
corpus to overturn the underlying burglary and murder convictions. After being denied
relief in the state courts, he ultimately prevailed in the Ninth Circuit. That court found
that the failure of Farmer's counsel "to present the most powerful exculpatory evidence
available to a defense attorney representing a client in a capital murder case, a third-party
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In the Scott/ Turner cases, a double murder arising out of a rob-
bery, Turner was tried first. The prosecutor introduced the testimony
of ajailhouse informer concerning a conversation between Scott and
Turner suggesting that Turner was the actual killer and Scott was sur-
prised by the killing. In asking for the death penalty, the prosecutor
attempted to lay the entire blame for the killings on Turner by argu-
ing that there was no evidence that Scott intended the killings. Turner
was convicted of the murders and sentenced to death, but the convic-
tion was overturned on appeal. 36 While Turner's case was on appeal,
Scott was tried for the robbery and murders, and the prosecutor
sought the death penalty against Scott on the theory that Scott had
intentionally aided and abetted in the killings. In pursuit of that the-
ory, the prosecutor unsuccessfully objected to the testimony of the in-
former, testimony which he had introduced at Turner's trial. Scott was
convicted of the murders, but the jury did not find a special circum-
stance (presumably finding that Scott neither killed nor intended the
killings). At Turner's retrial, the prosecutor returned to his original
theory: that only Turner intended the killings.
Scott clearly wanted to escape. That was the reason for tying the
victims. But not to kill them .... It may well be true that Scott
wanted to tie the victims. But only to escape. 37
Turner was once again found guilty and sentenced to death.
3 8
confession" constituted a clear case of ineffective assistance. Memorandum of Decision at
2, Farmer v. Ratelle, No. 96-56489 (9th Cir. 1997) (unpublished opinion).
On retrial, Farmer was acquitted of the second burglary and murder. See Mike
Kataoka, Retrial juy finds Lee Farmer not guilty, RIVERSIDE PREss-ENTERPRISE, Jan. 16, 1999, at
BI.
36. See People v. Turner, 726 P.2d 102, 103 (Cal. 1986).
37. Second Amended Petition for Habeas Corpus at 203, Turner v. Woodford, No. CV
965-2844 (C.D. Cal.).
38. While the prosecutor's use of inconsistent theories in these cases might have been
countered by an able and well prepared defense counsel, it is well known that most capital
defendants do not get such representation. See generally Louis D. Bilionis & Richard A.
Rosen, Lawyers, Arbitrariness, and the Eighth Amendment, 75 TEX. L. REv. 1301 (1997); Ste-
phen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst
Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835 (1994). California capital cases are no exception to the general
rule. In the last year alone (July 2001-June 2002), the Ninth Circuit, in seven California
capital cases, granted or affirmed habeas relief on the basis of ineffective assistance of
counsel. SeeJennings v. Woodford, 290 F.3d 1006, 1019-20 (9th Cir. 2002); Visciotti v.
Woodford, 288 F.3d 1097, 1109 (9th Cir. 2002); Karis v. Calderon, 283 F.3d 1117, 1141
(9th Cir. 2002); Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247, 1259 (9th Cir. 2002); Silva v. Woodford,
279 F.3d 825, 850 (9th Cir. 2002); Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915, 932-33 (9th Cir.
2001); Ainsworth v. Woodford, 268 F.3d 868, 878 (9th Cir. 2001). In both Thompson and
Farmer, the only two of the "inconsistent theories" cases to reach the Ninth Circuit, the
court granted relief on the basis of ineffective assistance. See supra notes 16 and 35.
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2. Possible Justifications for the Inconsistent Theories
There may be occasions when there is good cause for a prosecu-
tor's use of inconsistent theories at the separate trials of co-defend-
ants. Where a prosecutor, after the first trial, discovers evidence not
previously available that supports the theory of the second trial, there
should be no question that the change in theories is justified.3 9 In this
situation, the only question is whether the prosecutor should be able
to insist on the validity of the first conviction when the new evidence,
which the prosecutor has used and which the second jury has ac-
cepted, negates the theory by which the first conviction was ob-
tained.40 That issue is not presented in any of the six case pairs
because none involved a change in theory based on newly discovered
evidence.
The facts of the cases do suggest two other possible justifications
that might be offered for the prosecutor's change in theories. It
might be argued that presentation of different evidence in the two
cases is justified because evidence admissible against one defendant
was not admissible against the other.41 That was the situation, for ex-
ample, in the Sanchez/Reyes cases (inconsistency by commission),
where each defendant allegedly made statements to a different in-
former, and in the Bonner/Allison cases (inconsistency by omission)
where Bonner allegedly confessed to an informer. As the Ninth Cir-
cuit implicitly found in Thompson, however, the inadmissibility of cer-
tain evidence against one of the defendants is not good cause for a
change of theories.42 For the prosecutor to change theories, not be-
cause she now believes the second theory is correct, but only because
39. See United States v. Sharpe, 193 F.3d 852, 872 (5th Cir. 1999) ("there is no due
process violation when new significant evidence comes to light that justifies a subsequent
prosecution") (quoting Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 1997) (en
banc), rev'd on other grounds, 523 U.S. 538 (1998)).
40. It is difficult to imagine how a prosecutor could justify defending a conviction
obtained on the basis of a factual theory which she, herself, has proved to be false. In fact,
the prosecutor in this situation should be obliged to take affirmative steps to set aside the
first conviction. See H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a
Passionate Dispute, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1695, 1704 (2000) (stating that an ethical prosecu-
tor upon learning of post-conviction facts indicating innocence has a duty to resume the
role of neutral investigator and conduct "a thorough and dispassionate investigation of the
new development ... and, where the result warrants, the prosecutor must not hesitate to
cancel the victorious judgment and see that justice is done in the light of the amplified or
revised facts").
41. The most common example is an admission by one of the defendants (often to a
'jailhouse snitch") which is admissible against that defendant but is hearsay as to the co-
defendant. See supra note 19.
42. See Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1058-59.
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the rules of evidence encourage the change, plainly runs counter to
the prosecutor's duty to seek justice.
A more difficult question is whether the first jury's rejection of
the prosecution's theory justifies the prosecutor's changing theories
for the second trial. In three of the case pairs, the prosecutor failed to
obtain a death sentence in the first trial and changed theories to get a
death sentence in the second trial. In the Huffman/Farmer cases, the
prosecutor switched arguments after Huffman was acquitted, drop-
ping the theory that Huffman was a co-equal participant in the second
burglary and suggesting that Farmer acted alone. In the Scott/Turner
cases, after the jury failed to find a special circumstance true as to
Scott, the prosecutor changed theories to put the entire blame for the
killing on Turner. In the Bonner/Allison cases, after the first jury re-
fused to find that Bonner had personally used a gun, the prosecutor
changed theories to put the gun in Allison's hand. Is the first jury's
verdict good cause for shifting theories? The argument that it is good
cause necessarily derives from the premise that the jury's understand-
ing of the case is "truer" than was the prosecutor's, i.e., that, as in the
case of newly discovered evidence, the prosecutor has obtained new
information that has properly altered her view of the case. The argu-
ment cannot be sustained. The very reason that the courts find no
error when juries render inconsistent verdicts is that a jury's verdict
does not necessarily determine the "truth" of a charge. Juries are per-
mitted "to acquit out of compassion or compromise or because of
their assumption of a power which they had no right to exercise, but
to which they were disposed through lenity.'' 43 In reality, the prosecu-
tor knows the case much better than the jury ever can:
[T]he prosecutor is much better qualified than the jury at judging
the factual and legal truth of a case. The prosecutor knows much
more about the case than the jury could ever know. The prosecu-
tor has more information about the background of witnesses 'and
the defendant, and the availability of other admissible and non-
admissible evidence. The prosecutor has spent more time studying
the evidence than the jury, has more experience than the jury in
judging the credibility of particular witnesses, and has acquired an
expertise in specialized areas of prosecution that the jury lacks. 44
43. Standefer v. United States, 447 U.S. 10, 22 (1980) (quoting Dunn v. United States,
284 U.S. 390, 393 (1932)).
44. Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHiCS 309,
339-40 (2001) (footnotes omitted).
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In sum, the only legitimate justification for the prosecutor to
change factual theories is her discovery of new evidence following the
first trial.
3. The Effect of Inconsistent Theories
The effect of the use of inconsistent theories varies depending on
the phase of the trial at which the theory is relevant. In California, a
capital trial takes place in two phases: a guilt phase and a penalty
phase.45 At the guilt phase, the prosecution must prove the defendant
guilty of first degree murder and also must prove, beyond a reasona-
ble doubt, the existence of a special circumstance, making the defen-
dant death-eligible. 46 At the penalty phase, the jury hears evidence
regarding aggravation and mitigation and is read a list of eleven fac-
tors to consider in reaching its verdict. 47 In order to impose a death
sentence, the jury must determine that the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances. 4 However, in making this de-
termination, the jury is not required to make any particular findings
as to aggravating and mitigating circumstances and thus has "unbri-
dled discretion. '49 The differences between the two phases lead to dif-
ferences in the effect of the prosecutor's use of inconsistent theories.
In the Thompson/Leitch, Huffman/Farmer, and Sanchez/Reyes cases,
the prosecutor's inconsistencies affected the guilt phase verdicts as to
the death-sentenced defendant. In each of the case pairs, had the
prosecution presented, and the factfinder accepted, the prosecutor's
"other" theory or portions of the other theory, the factfinder would
have found the death-sentenced defendant not guilty, or at least not
death-eligible. In the Farmer case, had the jury accepted the prosecu-
tor's theory from Huffman that Huffman reentered the victim's apart-
ment and participated in the murder and the theory from Farmer that
only one person reentered the apartment and committed the murder,
they would have acquitted Farmer (as the jury, on retrial, did). In the
Sanchez case, if the testimony of the informant used in the Reyes case
were credited, Sanchez would not even have been found guilty of the
capital murders. According to the informant, it was Reyes, not
45. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1999). Where the defendant pleads not guilty
by reason of insanity, there is also a separate sanity phase between the guilt and penalty
phases. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026(a) (West. Supp. 2002).
46. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.4(a) (West 1999).
47. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1999).
48. See id.
49. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 979-80 (1994) (quoting Zant v. Stephens,
462 U.S. 862, 875 (1983)).
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Sanchez, who struck one of the victims, and neither Sanchez nor
Reyes anticipated the killing of the other victim. In the Thompson case,
had Thompson's jury accepted the prosecutor's theory from the Leitch
case, it would have found Thompson guilty of murder for aiding
Leitch in the killing, but it would not have found the special circum-
stance that the killing resulted from a rape.
In the Scott/ Turner, Bonner/Allison, and Waidla/Sakarias cases, the
prosecution's inconsistencies affected only the penalty phase. In each
case pair, the prosecution theory in the "other" case was that the
death-sentenced defendant participated in the murder and, therefore,
was death-eligible, but that the death-sentenced defendant was less
culpable than he was portrayed to be at his own trial. As the Supreme
Court has recognized, the issue of relative culpability is a "critical is-
sue" in the penalty phase of a death penalty case.50 In the Scott! Turner
cases, in the Scott trial, Scott was portrayed as equally responsible with
Turner for the killings: he tied up the victims; he intended the kill-
ings; his fingerprints were found on the murder weapon. In the Turner
trial, the prosecutor's theory was that Turner alone did the killings,
which caught Scott by surprise. In the Bonner/Allison cases, the prose-
cutor changed theories as to which of the two was the actual killer. In
the Waidla/Sakarias cases, the prosecutor also changed theories as to
who was the actual killer. At the Waidla trial he argued that Waidla was
the actual killer and Sakarias's blows were post-mortem, but at the
Sakarias trial he argued that the victim was alive when Sakarias struck
the fatal blows.
Unlike the use of inconsistent theories at the guilt phase, the use
of inconsistent theories at the penalty phase cannot be said necessarily
to have affected the result. Because of its "unbridled discretion" at the
penalty phase, ajury, even if it believed that the defendant had played
the lesser role in the killing described by the prosecutor in the other
case, still might have returned a death verdict. Nevertheless, as noted
above, relative culpability is a critical factor in the penalty determina-
tion. Consequently, the prosecutor's use of a substantially different
factual theory with regard to the defendant's role in the murder(s),
particularly the portrayal of the defendant as the actual killer rather
50. Green v. Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979). See also Samuel R. Gross, Update: Ameri-
can Public Opinion on the Death Penalty-It's Getting Persona 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1448,
1467-68 (1998) (finding that, when polled, only 25-29% of the people support the death
penalty for a non-killing accomplice).
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than as an aider and abettor, is at least reasonably likely to affect the
penalty determination. 5 1
B. The Use of Inconsistent Theories as Prosecutorial Misconduct
Although, as noted above, the Ninth Circuit found that the prose-
cutor's use of inconsistent theories in Thompson violated due pro-
cess,52 it has been the position of the prosecutors in the various cases
and/or the California Attorney General, arguing on their behalf, that
the use of inconsistent theories is not improper. Their argument may
be summed up as follows: as long as the prosecutor does not know-
ingly make false arguments or misstate the evidence at the particular
trial, or conceal material evidence in the particular case, she is not
guilty of misconduct, regardless of what she knows about the facts of
the case.5 3 Thus, in the Reyes case, the prosecutor explained her taking
of an inconsistent position in the Sanchez case as follows:
What I argued to the Judge [in Sanchez] was based on the evidence
that was before the Judge. It was not based on what I knew about
Charles Seeley [the informer]. It was not based on what I knew
aboutJoey Bocanegra [the actual killer]. It was not based on what I
knew about Robert Reyes. It was based on the evidence that was
before the Court.54
Contrary to the prosecutors' argument, courts and commentators
have taken the position that prosecutors' use of inconsistent factual
theories in successive trials may violate several ethical norms. The first
51. Whether the defendant challenging the use of inconsistent theories was tried first
or second is another variation that might affect the defendant's right to relief. See discus-
sion infra Parts 1II.B, III.C. Thompson, Sanchez and Waidla were tried first, so they would
be arguing to overturn verdicts on the basis of the prosecutor's post-verdict conduct.
Farmer, Turner, Allison and Sakarias were tried after their co-defendants, so they might
have challenged the prosecutors' change of theories (as Reyes actually did) on grounds of
estoppel, a challenge unavailable to the first person tried.
52. See Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1057-59 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
(plurality opinion), rev'd on other grounds, 523 U.S. 538 (1998); see also discussion infra Part
II.A.
53. As the Attorney General put it in the Allison case,
Rather than act as a self-appointed jury to decide who actually pulled the trigger,
the District Attorney's Office apparently decided to charge both defendants with
the personal use of a firearm enhancement, submit all of the evidence, including
[the informant's] testimony, to a jury, and allow the jury to weigh the conflicting
evidence and decide the facts.
Respondent's Reply to Opposition to Motion for Partial SummaryJudgment at 7, Allison v.
Woodford, No. CV 92-6404-CAS (C.D. Cal.).
54. Transcript of Daily Proceedings at 97, People v. Reyes, No. 34638 (Kern Co.
Super. Ct. Sept. 5, 1989).
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and most basic is the requirement that the prosecutor "seek justice." 55
The Supreme Court long ago stated, "It is as much [the prosecutor's]
duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring
about ajust one."5 6 The prosecutor's "seek justice" mandate has been
characterized as a "duty to the truth."57 The prosecutor's duty to the
truth arises from her constitutional obligations not to present false
evidence and to disclose material evidence favorable to the defen-
dant,58 from various ethical rules that "require prosecutors to have
confidence in the truth of the evidence before bringing or maintain-
ing criminal charges," 59 and from her power as a representative of the
government to affect the evaluation of facts by the fact-finder.60 As the
California Supreme Court recently made clear, the obligation of the
prosecutor not to become an "architect of a proceeding that does not
comport with the standards of justice" applies with special force in a
capital case. 61
55. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION
FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION (1993), at Standard 3-1.2(c) (adopting language from
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS].
56. Berger, 295 U.S. at 88. See also ETHICS COMrrrEE OF THE CAL. DisT. ATTORNEYS
ASS'N, PROFESSIONALISM, A SOURCEBOOK OF ETHICS AND CIVIL LIABILITY PRINCIPLES FOR PRO-
SECUTORS (Brian E. Michaels ed., 1998) at 111-2 [hereinafter PROFESSIONALISM] ("The prose-
cutor must be impeccably professional because he or she is required to meet standards of
candor and impartiality not demanded of [other attorneys].") (quoting People v. Kelley,
142 Cal. Rptr. 457, 466 (Ct. App. 1977)).
57. Gershman, supra note 44, at 313. See also Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1058 (noting that
the prosecutor "has the unique duty to ensure fundamentally fair trials by seeking not only
to convict, but also to vindicate the truth and administer justice."); United States v. Duke,
50 F.3d 571, 578 n.4 (8th Cir. 1995) (stating that the prosecutor has "duty to serve and
facilitate the truth-finding function of the courts"); Davis v. Zant, 36 F.3d 1538, 1548 n.15
(11th Cir. 1994) ("[P]rosecutors have a special duty of integrity in their arguments.");
United States v. Myerson, 18 F.3d 153, 162 n.10 (2d Cir. 1994) ("[T]he prosecutor has a
special duty not to mislead.") (quoting United States v. Universita, 298 F.2d 365, 367 (2d
Cir. 1962)).
58. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
59. Gershman, supra note 44, at 314, 316. ("A prosecutor who proceeds with a case
without being personally convinced of the defendant's guilt violates [her duty to truth]
and creates an unacceptable risk that an innocent person will be convicted.").
60. See United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1985) ("[T]he prosecutor's opinion
carries with it the imprimatur of the Government and may induce the jury to trust the
Government's judgment rather than its own view of the evidence."); Gershman, supra note
44, at 315 (stating that the prosecutor has the power to affect the evaluation of the facts by
the fact-finder because the jury "inevitably view[s] the prosecutor as a special guardian and
thus a warrantor of the facts-an expert who can be trusted to use the facts responsibly").
61. People v. Seaton, 28 P.3d 175, 205 (Cal. 2001) (quoting Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83, 88 (1963)). In Seaton, the court emphasized that while most attorneys "may ethi-
cally present evidence that they suspect, but do not personally know, is false," quoting
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The general duty of the prosecutor to "seek justice," is informed
by more specific ethical rules to which prosecutors must adhere
throughout the course of a criminal prosecution. The American Bar
Association Prosecution Standards ("ABA Standards") require that the
prosecutor have probable cause in order to institute a prosecution 62
and refrain from instituting charges unless she has sufficient admissi-
ble evidence to support a conviction.63 However, commentators have
concluded that more should be required, that, to fulfill her duty to
seek justice, the prosecutor should not institute a prosecution unless
she is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt.64
In charging two defendants with a role in a murder that only one of
them could have played, the prosecutor has violated ethical norms
that require that she first determine the factual and legal truth of the
case and then charge accordingly. 65 At trial, the prosecutor corrupts
the truth-seeking function, and therefore violates the duty to "seek
justice," when she "takes irreconcilably inconsistent positions to ob-
People v. Riel, 998 P.2d 969, 1013 (Cal. 2000), a prosecutor who has serious doubts about a
witness's testimony "should not present that evidence to a jury," id.
62. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 55, at Standard 3-3.9 (a) ("A prosecutor should not
institute, or cause to be instituted, or permit the continued pendency of criminal charges
when the prosecutor knows that the charges are not supported by probable cause.").
63. See id. ("A prosecutor should not institute, cause to be instituted, or permit the
continued pendency of criminal charges in the absence of sufficient admissible evidence to
support a conviction.").
64. See Carol Corrigan, On Prosecutorial Ethics, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 537, 540
(1986) ("The prosecutor does no one a service when, entertaining a doubt himself, he
charges with the intent to let the jury decide."); Gershman, supra note 44, at 338-41 ("[A]
prosecutor should not proceed with a case unless he is personally convinced, beyond a
reasonable doubt, of the factual truth of his case-that his witnesses are truthful and accu-
rate-and of the legal truth [of his case]-that the evidence proves the defendant's guilt
of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt."); Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors
"Seek Justice"? 26 FORDHAM UPs. L.J. 607, 641 (1999) (concluding that prosecutors "must
satisfy themselves of an individual's guilt as a precondition to determining that the convic-
tion of an individual is an end to be sought on behalf of the state or the federal govern-
ment"); Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992 BYU L. Rv.
669, 701 (1992) (asserting that a prosecutor should not charge a defendant "unless person-
ally satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt"). See also Uviller, supra
note 40, at 1703 ("The conscientious prosecutor, then, will not be content with 'technical'
sufficiency for the commencement of a criminal prosecution. The prosecutor should be
assured to a fairly high degree of certainty that he has the right person, the right crime,
and a good chance of success.").
65. See Green, supra note 64, at 620, 639 (stating that because a prosecutor should be
as certain as possible of the defendants' guilt before charging, it is unethical for the prose-
cutor to separately charge two defendants with an act that only one of them could have
committed, and then leave it to the jury to decide whether to convict either or both).
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tain convictions against several defendants for the same crime." 66 In
addition, the prosecutor's use of inconsistent theories violates the
ABA's Model Code for Professional Responsibility ("Model Code"),
which states that the accused "is to be given the benefit of all reasona-
ble doubts."67 By arguing inconsistent theories, the prosecutor "ex-
ploits the doubt that exists in the case, rather than giving the
defendant the benefit of all reasonable doubts as the code requires. 68
Various judges have expressed the same view. The Ninth Circuit plu-
rality in Thompson and Judge Clark, concurring in Drake v. Kemp,69 la-
beled the prosecutor's use of inconsistent theories in the separate
trials of co-defendants as a violation of the duty to seek justice. 70 Simi-
larly, in United States v. Kattar,7 1 the First Circuit stated that it is the
prosecutor's duty to make certain that the "truth is honored to the
fullest extent possible during the course of the criminal prosecution
and trial."' 72 Therefore, " [i]f it happens that the government's original
perspective on the events in question is proven inaccurate, such reve-
lation is in the government's interest as well as the defendant's. The
criminal trial should be viewed not as an adversarial sporting contest,
but as a quest for truth."73 The Eighth Circuit reached a similar con-
clusion in Smith v. Groose,74 noting that the "system is poorly served
when a prosecutor, the state's own instrument of justice, stacks the
deck in his favor. The State's duty to its citizens does not allow it to
pursue as many convictions as possible without regard to fairness and
the search for truth. 75
Within the general ethical requirement imposed on the prosecu-
tor to "seek justice," is the more specific requirement that the prose-
66. Gershman, supra note 44, at 326-27. In coming to his conclusion, Gershman
makes no distinction between cases where only one of the defendants could have commit-
ted the crime and cases where two or more co-defendants were involved in the crime, and
the prosecutor took inconsistent positions regarding the role that each defendant played
in the crime. Id.
67. MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1980).
68. Michael Q. English, A Prosecutor's Use of Inconsistent Factual Theories of a Crime in
Successive Trials: Zealous Advocacy or a Due Process Violation?, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 525, 555
(1999).
69. 762 F.2d 1449, 1470 (11th Cir. 1985) (ClarkJ., concurring).
70. See Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.2d 1045, 1059 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) rev'd on
other grounds, 523 U.S. 538 (1998); Drake, 762 F.2d at 1470 (Clark, J., concurring) (stating
that prosecutors' use of inconsistent theories "reduce [s] criminal trials to mere gamesman-
ship and rob[s] them of their supposed search for truth").
71. 840 F.2d 118 (1st Cir. 1988).
72. Id. at 127.
73. Id.
74. 205 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 2000).
75. Id. at 1051.
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cutor "shall not knowingly... make a false statement of fact or law to
a tribunal"76 or "offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false." 77
Further, the ethical rules prohibit the prosecutor from intentionally
misrepresenting matters of fact or law to the court.78 Where the prose-
cutor argues inconsistent versions of the facts at the separate trials of
co-defendants, even where she does not knowingly introduce false evi-
dence or make a false statement of fact, the prosecutor necessarily has
violated the ethical rule not to mislead the jury orjudge in one case or
the other.79
The role of the penalty hearing in a capital case implicates yet
another ethical obligation of the prosecutor, to "seek to assure that a
fair and informed judgment is made on the sentence."80 Included in
this duty is the requirement that the prosecution reveal exculpatory
information to the sentencing judge or jury.8' Consequently, when a
prosecutor argues inconsistently to the judge or jury regarding the
pertinent sentencing factors, she is providing inaccurate or mislead-
ing sentencing information and thereby contributing to an inaccurate
sentence s2 In addition, because the prosecutor is required under the
76. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1) (2001).
77. Id. at R. 3.3(a)(4) (2001).
78. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 55, at Standard 3-2.8(a) ("[a] prosecutor should
not intentionally misrepresent matters of fact or law to the court"); CALIFORNIA RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5-200(A) (3) (1995) (requiring that, in presenting matters to a tribu-
nal, an attorney must "employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to [him
or her] such means only as are consistent with truth and never to seek to mislead the judge
or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law"); PROFESSIONALISM,
supra note 56, at 1I1-4 (stating that a prosecutor may not "misstate the evidence presented
or attempt to mislead the jury").
79. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 13.10.4, at 766 (1986) ("A
prosecutor must ... assure that full and undistorted facts are presented at trial.").
80. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 55, at Standard 3-6.1 (a) ("To the extent that the pros-
ecutor becomes involved in the sentencing process, he or she should seek to assure that a
fair and informed judgment is made on the sentence and to avoid unfair sentence dispari-
ties."). This requires that the prosecutor, at sentencing, continue to accord the defendant
procedural justice. See id. at Standard 3-6.2 cmt.
81. See id. at Standard 3-6.2 cmt.; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2001)
(requiring that the prosecutor "in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and
to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor"); MODEL
CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(B) (1980) ("A public prosecutor.., shall make
timely disclosure ... of the existence of evidence, known to the prosecutor ... that tends
to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce the punish-
ment"); PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 56, at 111-15 ("[C]onstitutional law and ethics rules
compel[ ] a prosecutor to make known any evidence which would negate guilt, reduce the
degree of responsibility or mitigate punishment.").
82. See Nichols v. Collins, 802 F.Supp. 66, 74 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (condemning the prose-
cutor's use of inconsistent theories at sentencing, because "the state of Texas has deter-
mined, by law, that it is important for purposes of sentencing that a jury know which
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ethical rules to turn over all mitigating evidence relevant to sentenc-
ing that tends to reduce punishment,8 3 the prosecutor is required to
disclose all evidence supporting each inconsistent theory used as to
the other defendant. When the prosecutor fails to do this, she has
violated her ethical obligations. Further, by arguing inconsistent theo-
ries at sentencing, the prosecutor is effectively trying to obtain the
harshest possible sentence for each codefendant regardless of the ex-
istence of true mitigating evidence. This violates the prosecutor's duty
to "ensure that individuals are not punished more harshly than de-
served. '84 Further, such behavior suggests that the prosecutor, in vio-
lation of the ethical rules, is judging her effectiveness based on the
severity of the sentences she obtains.8 5
Finally, the prosecutor must avoid conduct that undermines pub-
lic confidence in the integrity of the legal system. 86 Specifically, "the
prosecutor must execute the duties of this representative office dili-
gently and fairly, avoiding even the appearance of impropriety that
might reflect poorly on the State. '87 When two defendants are con-
victed for a crime that only one of them could have committed, or
when one (or both) of two co-defendants receives a harsher sentence
based on inconsistent theories at trial and sentencing, the public can-
not have confidence that the trials were fair and/or that the convic-
tions and sentences were just. The use of inconsistent theories itself
demonstrates to the public that criminal trials are not a search for
truth and that prosecutors are allowed to use unfair means to secure
convictions.88 Judge Kozinski, even while dissenting from the grant of
[defendant] did fire the bullet"), rev'd on other grounds, in Nichols v. Scott, 69 F.3d 1255
(5th Cir. 1995).
83. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
84. Green, supra note 64, at 634.
85. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 55, at Standard 3-6.1 (a). ("The prosecutor should
not make the severity of sentences the index of his or her effectiveness.").
86. See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 9-2 (1980) ("When explicit ethical
guidance does not exist, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity and efficiency of the legal system and the legal
profession."); NAT'L DIST. ATroRNEYs ASS'N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS Standard
25.1 cmt. (1977) ("As a public prosecutor constantly in the public eye, it is imperative that
the prosecutor ... avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety."); Green, supra
note 64, at 636 (asserting that the prosecutor has a "duty to avoid the public perception
that criminal proceedings are unfair.").
87. People v. Trevino, 704 P.2d 719, 725 (Cal. 1985), overruled on other grounds, People
v. Johnson, 767 P.2d 1047 (Cal. 1989).
88. See Smith v. Groose, 205 F.3d 1045, 1051-52 (8th Cir. 2000); Thompson v. Calde-
ron, 120 F.3d 1045, 1057-59 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 523 U.S. 538
(1998); Nichols v. Collins, 802 F.Supp. 66, 74 (S.D. Tex. 1992) ("[T]he integrity of the
judicial system commands that citizens can rest assured that prosecutors are seeking truth
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relief in Thompson, stated that "[w]hether or not the United States
Constitution allows [prosecutors] to argue inconsistent theories to dif-
ferent juries, it surely does not inspire public confidence in our crimi-
nal justice system for prosecutors to leave themselves open to charges
of manipulation." 89
Prosecutors' use of inconsistent factual theories in successive
cases violates ethical norms, but the question remains whether the
death row defendant is entitled to relief on that ground. Several
courts and individual judges have recognized that prosecutors were
guilty of misconduct in this regard, but have taken the position that
defendants were not entitled to relief.90 As we will see, the California
courts have yet to grant relief on this ground.
C. Inconsistent Theories in the California Courts
Although the inconsistent theories problem now has been raised
in seven capital cases, either on appeal or on habeas corpus,91 the
California Supreme Court has had little to say on the subject. The
Court failed or refused to address the issue in upholding the death
sentences in Thompson, Allison, Sanchez, and Waidla. In Farmer, which
involved inconsistency by inference, the court addressed the inconsis-
tency issue only in dicta:
[C]ounsel have a right to present to the jury their views on the
deductions or inferences that the facts warrant. Their reasoning
may be faulty, but this is a matter for the jury to decide. Even if the
prosecutor had argued in the Huffman case that the evidence
pointed to Huffman's guilt and in the present case that it sug-
and justice; and that when they find truth and justice they cannot seek a different truth
and a different justice from the first."), rev'd on other grounds, Nichols v. Scott, 69 F.3d 1255
(5th Cir. 1995).
89. Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1072. Such charges have been made in the press about
California prosecutors. See Alan Abrahamson, Conviction Upheld in One-Bullet Case, L.A.
TiMES, June 7, 1997, at BI; Bob Egelko, Doublespeak: I crime and 2 convicts, S.F. EXAM., Oct.
8, 2000, at Al.
90. See, e.g., Thompson, 120 F.3d at 1063-64 (Tashima, J., concurring); United States v.
Kattar, 840 F.2d 118, 127 (1st Cir. 1988).
91. It is unclear which is the appropriate proceeding for raising the inconsistent theo-
ries issue because of the California Supreme Court's seemingly contradictory rulings on
the subject. Compare Order at 1, In re Allison, No. S042478 (Cal. Sup. Ct. April 16, 1997)
(rejecting Allison's inconsistent theories claim on habeas corpus "because [it] could have
been, but [was] not, raised on appeal") with People v. Sakarias, 995 P.2d 152, 176 (Cal.
2000) (holding that inconsistent theories claim "should be presented by petition for writ of
habeas corpus rather than by appeal") (quoting People v. Sanchez, 906 P.2d 1129, 1166
(Cal. 1995)).
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gested defendant was guilty, his argument would not be improper
as long as it was based on the record and made in good faith. 92
While the court appeared to sanction the making of inconsistent argu-
ments, the key element of the court's statement, "good faith," was not
defined, so the court's position remains unclear. In Turner, the other
case involving inconsistency by inference, the court again addressed
the issue in dicta (after holding that the defendant had failed to pre-
serve the issue by objecting at trial) and stated that Turner was not
prejudiced by any inconsistency in the prosecutor's argument because
the challenged inconsistency concerned only Scott's role in the kill-
ing, not Turner's. 93 In Sakarias, a case of inconsistency by omission,
the court recognized the issue:
That a prosecutor's knowing use of false evidence or argument to
obtain a criminal conviction or sentence deprives the defendant of
due process is well established. Less clear is whether, knowing fal-
sity aside, a prosecutor oversteps constitutional limits by asserting,
in separate trials of different defendants, factually inconsistent or
contradictory theories of the criminal events.
94
However, the court refused to address Sakarias's claim, finding that it
would be better addressed on habeas corpus. 95
The only substantial discussion of the inconsistent theories issue
in the California courts, albeit not in the context of a capital case,
appears in the Court of Appeal's decision in People v. Watts.9 6 Watts,
Shaw and Dues had entered a restaurant and, between them, robbed
two employees at gunpoint and attempted to rob victim Bishop and
another. One of the robbers pointed a gun at Bishop and forced her
92. People v. Farmer, 765 P.2d 940, 962-63 (Cal. 1989) (citations omitted), partially
overruled on other grounds by People v. Waidla, 996 P.2d 46, 66 n.6 (Cal. 2000). The statement
was dicta because the court had earlier held that the defense counsel's attempt to argue
the inconsistencies to the jury was properly barred by the trial court since the defense had
failed to introduce the prosecutor's inconsistent arguments in evidence. See Farmer, 765
P.2d at 962. The court did grant Farmer a penalty reversal, finding that a different argu-
ment made by the prosecutor was improper. See id. at 968.
93. See People v. Turner, 878 P.2d 521, 553 (Cal. 1994).
94. People v. Sakarias, 995 P.2d 152, 174 (Cal. 2000) (citations omitted).
95. See id. at 177. The issue has been reraised in Sakarias's pending habeas corpus
petition. See generally In re Sakarias, No. S082299 (Cal. Sup. Ct.).
96. 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 1 (Ct. App. 1999), rev. denied, 2000 Cal. LEXIS 1428 (Mosk and
Kennard,JJ., dissenting), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 837 (2000). The issue was mentioned in an
earlier case, People v. Hoover, 231 Cal. Rptr. 203, 211 (Ct. App. 1986), where the court
upheld a murder conviction arguably based on inconsistent theories. However, Hoover is a
dubious precedent, in that the court's entire analysis of the issue is contained in the state-
ment: "[N]o rule of misconduct or due process binds a prosecutor to a theory asserted in
closing argument in a related prosecution," id. at 208, and none of the three cases cited by
the court for that proposition were inconsistent theories cases. See id.
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to the floor, and the same robber forced her to try to open the safe.97
Shaw was tried before Watts and, inter alia, was found to have person-
ally used a firearm in the attempted robbery of Bishop. Watts was sub-
sequently tried and (in addition to being convicted of various other
counts) also was found to have personally used a firearm against
Bishop. On appeal, Watts challenged the firearm use enhancement
on due process and judicial estoppel grounds.98 Although the court
acknowledged that the two verdicts were inconsistent and that "[a] t
first blush, the action of the prosecutor in seeking a conviction against
[Watts] for certain crimes after having secured a conviction against
Shaw for the same crimes, is troubling,"99 the court found no
prosecutorial misconduct and no basis for granting relief. The court
found no due process violation because the prosecutor had probable
cause to charge Watts, there was no indication that the prosecutor had
caused the witnesses to change their testimony or otherwise had acted
improperly, and there was sufficient evidence to support the firearm
use finding.100 The court refused to apply judicial estoppel-the doc-
trine barring a litigant from taking a position inconsistent with a posi-
tion which the litigant had successfully asserted in a previous case 1 -
because there was no authority for applying the doctrine against the
government in a criminal case and because the doctrine "should not
act to prevent the State from taking inconsistent factual positions in
separate proceedings.' 1 2 In the end, the court found no misconduct
and no threat to the integrity of the judicial process from the convic-
tion of two defendants for a crime only one of them committed.' 0 3
97. See Watts, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 3-5.
98. See id. at 7.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 8. The court suggested that, in fact, it was the finding against Shaw that
was erroneous.
101. See discussion infta Part III.B.
102. Id. at 9. But see In re Derrick R., 2001 WL 1554217 at *4 n.4 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)
("The doctrine of judicial estoppel generally precludes a prosecutor from pursuing incon-
sistent theories at separate trials.") (citing Thompson v. Calderon 109 F.3d 1358, 1371 (9th
Cir.1996)).
103. See Watts, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 10. The court explained that the prosecutor does not
vouch for the version of the facts she is presenting:
That the evidence adduced during one proceeding provides proof that one thing
in fact occurred, while the evidence adduced during a second proceeding pro-
vides proof that a different thing in fact occurred, is an unavoidable risk of the
judicial process .... [T]he prosecutor's argument is not that a particular set of
facts is the true set of facts; but that the evidence shows that a particular set of facts
is the true set of facts.
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II. The Federal Constitution and Inconsistent Theories
The Supreme Court has never addressed directly whether the
prosecutor's use of inconsistent factual theories in a capital case vio-
lates the Constitution. The inconsistent theories problem was
presented to the Court in Green v. Georgia,10 4 where the prosecutor
had used inconsistent factual theories as to the roles of two co-defend-
ants in a murder. The inconsistency was created by the introduction
of the co-defendant's confession in the first trial but not in Green's
trial.10 5 However, without addressing the inconsistent theories issue as
such, the Court vacated the penalty determination on the ground that
due process was violated when Green was not permitted to introduce
the confession at his trial. 10 6 The only discussion of the issue is in
Justice Stevens' dissent from the denial of a stay of execution in Jacobs
v. Scott.10 7 Jesse Jacobs and his sister, Bobbie Hogan, were each
charged with kidnapping and murdering a woman in the woods. At
Jacobs' trial, the prosecution introduced Jacobs' confession to the ef-
fect that he had abducted and fatally shot the victim and presented
testimony that Jacobs had led investigators to her body. Jacobs, how-
ever, testified that the confession was false and that he had made it in
hopes of getting the death penalty rather than life imprisonment. He
testified that he kidnapped the victim and brought her to a cabin in
the woods, but it was Hogan who shot the victim. According to Jacobs,
he had not known that Hogan was armed and was not present when
the killing occurred.' 08 The prosecutor argued to the jury that "[t]he
simple fact of the matter is that Jesse Jacobs and Jesse Jacobs alone
killed [the victim]."1°9 Jacobs was convicted and sentenced to death.
At Hogan's subsequent trial, the prosecutor abandoned his theory
thatJacobs had killed the victim and instead called Jacobs as a prose-
cution witness to testify that Hogan was the killer.
The prosecutor told the jury that he had "changed my mind about
what actually happened. ... And I'm convinced thatJesse Jacobs is
telling the truth when he says that Bobbie Hogan is the one that
pulled the trigger."110
104. 442 U.S. 95 (1979).
105. See id. at 96. The case is similar, in this respect, to the Bonner/Allison cases. See
discussion supra pp. 7-8.
106. See id. at 97.
107. 513 U.S. 1067 (1995) (Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
108. See id. at 1067-68.
109. Id. at 1068 (quotingJacobs v. Scott, 31 F.3d 1319, 1322 n.6 (5th Cir. 1994)).
110. Id. (quoting 31 F.3d at 1322 n.6 ).
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Justice Stevens, writing for himself and Justice Ginsburg, thought the
case raised "a serious question of prosecutorial misconduct," and,
analogizing the case to those where the Court had found due process
violations based on the prosecutor's introduction of false testimony,
he described the result as fundamentally unfair.Ill Justice Stevens also
referred to the "heightened need for reliability" in capital cases, 112
thereby suggesting that the prosecution of co-defendants on inconsis-
tent theories might violate the Eighth Amendment. 113
Both the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment may be
read to prohibit the prosecutor's use of inconsistent'factual theories
in capital, cases. In the absence of a clearly controlling decision from
the Supreme Court, the lower courts have reached conflicting deci-
sions on 'due process claims based on the use of inconsistent theories
and have barely mentioned the Eighth Amendment in this context. 114
A. Due Process
The prosecutor's use of inconsistent factual theories in capital
cases has most often been challenged as a violation of due process.
The issie lies at the intersection of three lines of United States Su-
preme 'Court criminal due process cases. The first line of cases, re-
ferred io by Justice Stevens in Jacobs, concerns the situation where the
prosecutor knowingly introduces, or fails to correct, false evidence.1 15
Such conduct violates due process, and, although the rule, as stated,
would'appear to require bad faith on the part of the prosecutor, a due
process violation is said to occur if the prosecutor knew or should have
f
111. Id. at 1069.
112. , Id. at 1070 (quoting Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323 (1985)).
113. See discussion infra Part II.B. JesseJacobs was executed on January 4, 1995. See Sue
Anne Pressley, Texas Prisoner Executed Despite Questions of Guilt, WASH. PosT, Jan. 5, 1995, at
A3.
114. Whether such constitutional rights, if recognized by the courts, would be enforce-
able on federal habeas corpus in light of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2001) (requiring the
petitioner to show that a claim is "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States")
or the doctrine of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (barring generally any claim
based on a "new rule") is beyond the scope of the article. Compare Smith v. Groose, 205
F.3d 1045, 1053-54 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that a rule that the prosecutor's use of incon-
sistent theories violated due process is not a "new rule" within the meaning of Teague) with
Nichols v. Scott, 69 F.3d 1255, 1273-74 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding that defendant's due pro-
cess claim based on the prosecutor's use of inconsistent theories seeks the benefit of a
"new rule" and is barred by Teague).
115. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) (summarizing cases holding that
knowing use of false evidence and failure to correct false evidence violate due process and
finding that prosecutor had failed to correct false evidence related to the credibility of a
witness).
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known that the evidence was false."16 The second line of cases con-
cerns the situation where the prosecutor presents a false argument,
either by urging the factfinder to draw a false inference from the evi-
dence or by misstating the evidence. 117 Again, such conduct violates
due process if, but for such conduct, there is a reasonable probability
that the result would have been different.1 18 The third line of cases
concerns the situation where the prosecutor suppresses evidence
favorable to the defendant.'19 Where the suppressed evidence is mate-
rial, such conduct again violates due process.120 Plainly, the prosecu-
tor's use of inconsistent theories may involve conduct found to be a
due process violation under one of the above rules, but it may not.121
That the prosecutor relied on inconsistent evidence or made ,inconsis-
tent arguments and that one version of the evidence or arguments was
necessarily false may not establish a due process violation under the
first two rules if the death row defendant cannot show that the factual
theory used in his case was the false one.122 Nor, as the California cases
demonstrate, does the prosecutor's use of inconsistent theories neces-
sarily result from the suppression of evidence used, or to be used, in
the co-defendant's case. The question, then, is whether the prosecu-
tor's use of inconsistent theories in a capital case violates due process
even when such conduct does not fall squarely within one of the three
lines of cases discussed above.
The answer from the lower federal courts is that sometimes the
prosecutor's use of inconsistent theories does violate due process, and
sometimes it does not. When the inconsistent theories are the product
of the prosecutor's use of contradictory evidence ("inconsistency by
116. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 (1976); Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204,
1208 (9th Cir. 2002).
117. See Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1967) (finding violation of due process-where
prosecutor argued to the jury that paint-stained shorts were blood-stained). Cf Darden v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181-82 (1986) (implying that the prosecutor would have vio-
lated due process if he had "manipulate[d] or misstate[d] the evidence").
118. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
119. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 84 (1963).
120. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432 (1995) (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at.87).
121. In addition to challenging directly the prosecutor's use of inconsistent theories,
the defendants in the California cases have asserted due process claims based on one or
more of the three lines of cases, see, e.g., People v. Sanchez, 906 P.2d 1129, 1166 (Cal. 1995)
(asserting that prosecutor acted in bad faith by making inconsistent arguments) or ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claims based on trial counsel's failure to challenge the prosecu-
tor's inconsistency, see, e.g., Turner v. Woodford, No. CV 965-2844 (C.D. Cal.).
122. See, e.g., Beathard v. Johnson, 177 F.3d 340, 348 (5th Cir. 1999); Thompson v.
Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1064 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (Tashima,J. concurring), rev'd on
other grounds, 523 U.S. 538 (1998); Littlejohn v. State, 989 P.2d 901, 908-09 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1998).
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commission"), the rule appears to be that there is a due process viola-
tion if the inconsistency is material. The leading case, and the only
case where relief has been granted on that ground, is the Eighth Cir-
cuit's decision in Smith v. Groose,123 a non-capital murder case. The
underlying facts in Smith describe a bizarre encounter between two
independent groups bent on burglarizing the same house. At some
point during the competing burglaries, the two occupants of the
house were murdered. The prosecution had two contradictory state-
ments from an informer, who was a member of Smith's group, as to
how the murder occurred. The first version pointed to Cunningham,
a member of the other group, as the killer. The second version
pointed to Bowman (a member of the Smith group) as the killer. At
Smith's trial for aiding Bowman in the murders, the informer testified
to the first version of events, but the prosecution introduced and re-
lied on the second version to impeach the informer and also to pro-
vide substantive evidence of Smith's guilt. Subsequently, the
prosecution charged Cunningham with the murders and relied on the
informer's testimony to the first version of events to obtain murder
and burglary convictions against Cunningham. 124 The court reversed
Smith's convictions, holding that the use of inconsistent theories con-
stitutes a due process violation if: (1) the prosecutor presented evi-
dence and arguments that were "inherently contradictory" in the two
separate proceedings; and (2) the inconsistency went to "the core of
the prosecutor's cases" against the defendants.125
The Ninth Circuit and Eleventh Circuit, although not having the
occasion to grant a defendant relief based on the prosecutor's use of
inconsistent factual theories, have recognized that when the inconsis-
tent theories result from the prosecutor's presentation of contradic-
tory evidence, due process is violated. In Thompson v. Calderon,1 26 the
123. 205 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 2000).
124. See id. at 1047-48.
125. Id. at 1051-52. Subsequently, the Eighth Circuit distinguished Smith in rejecting
an inconsistent theories claim in United States v. Pau 217 F.3d 989, 998-99 (8th Cir. 2000).
In Paul, a capital murder case, the claimed inconsistency concerned whether Paul or the
other participant 'had fired the fatal shot. The court found that any inconsistency was
irrelevant. "When it cannot be determined which of two defendants' guns caused a fatal
wound and either defendant could have been convicted under either theory, the prosecu-
tion's argument at both trials that the defendant on trial pulled the trigger is not factually
inconsistent."
Id. In fact, since the jury, at the guilt phase, found that Paul had intentionally aided in the
killing, it apparently did not accept the prosecutor's argument that Paul had fired the fatal
shot. See id. at 996. Paul's assumed lesser role in the killing did not deter the jury from
sentencing him to death. Id. at 989.
126. 120 F.3d at 1059; see discussion supra pp. 1-4.
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Ninth Circuit granted habeas relief on other grounds, but Judge
Fletcher, writing for a four-judge plurality of the en banc court, also
would have granted relief on the ground that the prosecutor's use of
inconsistent theories in the Thompson/Leitch cases violated due pro-
cess. "[I]t is well established that when no new significant evidence
comes to light a prosecutor cannot, in order to convict two defendants
at separate trials, offer inconsistent theories and facts regarding the
same crime."'127 In the view of the plurality, "little about the trials re-
mained consistent other than the prosecutor's desire to win at any
cost. '1 28 The court found that the prosecutor had manipulated evi-
dence, argued inconsistent motives, and, at Leitch's trial, ridiculed
the theory he had used to obtain a conviction and death sentence
against Thompson. 129 Three concurring judges did not join in this
part of Judge Fletcher's opinion, 3°1 but Judge Tashima, writing for
himself and Judge Thomas, agreed with the plurality that, "due pro-
cess is violated when a prosecutor pursue [s] wholly inconsistent theo-
ries of a case at separate trials." 131 Tashima's view of the issue is less
than pellucid, however, because he went on to discuss whether
Thompson was "prejudiced." "Thus, although I agree that there was a
due process violation, absent a finding of which version is true, I am
unprepared to decide whether or not Thompson was prejudiced by
it.'"132 The implication of this statement is that Thompson would be
entitled to relief only if the evidence used against Thompson were
shown to be false. If that, in fact, isJudge Tashima's position, he is not
recognizing a due process violation based on the use of inconsistent
theories-he is requiring the defendant to meet the more difficult
standard of showing that the prosecutor used false evidence. -13 Never-
theless, the plurality's opinion on this issue appears to be accepted law
in the circuit. In Nguyen v. Lindsey,134 another case of inconsistency by
127. Id. at 1058. The court had previously addressed an inconsistent theories claim in
Haynes v. Cupp, 827 F.2d 435, 439 (9th Cir. 1987) (rejecting the claim on the ground that
the underlying prosecutorial theory remained consistent in the two cases).
128. 120 F.3d at 1059.
129. See id. at 1057.
130. See id. at 1047.
131. Id. at 1063 (quoting the panel decision in Thompson v. Calderon, 109 F.3d 1358,
1371 (9th Cir. 1996)).
132. Id. at 1064.
133. The statement also is puzzling because, even to make out a due process violation,
the defendant must show materiality, i.e., that, but for the prosecutor's misconduct, there
was a reasonable probability of a different result. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,
682 (1985). If the defendant has shown the materiality of the misconduct, he has shown
prejudice.
134. 232 F.3d 1236 (9th Cir. 2000).
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commission (the prosecutor offered contradictory evidence as to
which of two gang members had fired first in a gang shootout result-
ing in the death of a bystander), the court cited to Thompson for the
proposition that a prosecutor's use of inconsistent theories is miscon-
duct but found Thompson inapplicable because, in the case before it,
the inconsistency was immaterial since both defendants would be
guilty of murder in any case for voluntarily joining the shootout1 35 In
United States v. Bakshinian,136 the district court, ruling on the defen-
dant's motion to prevent the government from adopting a theory in
his trial inconsistent with that adopted in a previous trial, read Thomp-
son as requiring that, "between one trial and another, the government
may not take inconsistent positions as to what occurred." 3 7 In fact,
the government did not dispute that such was the rule but asserted
that its theories were consistent. 3 8
The Eleventh Circuit first addressed the issue of inconsistent the-
ories in Drake v. Kemp. 139 In Drake, although the majority granted relief
on other grounds, Judge Clark stated in his concurring opinion his
belief that the prosecutor's use of inconsistent theories violated due
process ' 40 The inconsistency in Drake involved contradictory evidence
as to whether Drake or his co-defendant was the actual killer, and the
prosecutor, at Drake's trial, presented a version of the facts that he
had argued was "unbelievable" at the co-defendant's prior trial.141
While Judge Clark's description of the prosecutor as having obtained
Drake's conviction "through the use of testimony he did not be-
lieve"' 42 might suggest that he viewed the problem as one of false or
perjured evidence, his assertion that the prosecution's "flip flopping
of theories of the offense was inherently unfair" and that "[u] nder the
peculiar facts of this case the actions by the prosecutor violate that
135. See id. at 1240. The court's holding in Nguyen highlights the difference between
capital and non-capital cases. The inconsistency in the prosecutor's theory as to who fired
first was immaterial because Nguyen was a non-capital murder case. In a capital case, the
issue would be material because of the significance of comparative culpability at the pen-
alty phase.
136. 65 F. Supp. 2d 1104 (C.D. Cal. 1999).
137. Id. at 1108.
138. See id. at 1109.
139. 762 F.2d 1449 (lth Cir. 1985).
140. See id. at 1479. Clark's opinion on this issue, although not for the court, has been
frequently cited and relied upon in other cases on this issue. See, e.g., United States v.
Dickerson, 248 F.3d 1036, 1044 (1lth Cir. 2001); Smith v. Groose, 205 F.2d 1045,1050 (8th
Cir. 2000).




fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice,"143
plainly imply that it was the change of theories-rather than the false-
ness of the theory used in Drake's case-that constituted the due pro-
cess violation. Subsequently, in Parker v. Singletay,144 another capital
case where the prosecutors offered inconsistent theories as to who,
among three defendants, was the actual shooter, the court implicitly
accepted Judge Clark's view but distinguished the case before it be-
cause in Parker (unlike Drake), the prosecution did not make use of
"necessarily contradictory evidence."'145 Recently, in United States v.
Dickerson,146 the court again assumed that Judge Clark's opinion, and
the opinion of the plurality in Thompson, correctly stated the law.147
However, the court distinguished the case before it on the facts, find-
ing that "any alleged inconsistency in the Government's conspiracy
theory had no impact on the likelihood of Dickerson being
convicted." 48
In the Fifth Circuit, the question was presented in Clark v. John-
son,149 a capital case, but the court's opinion denying relief gives no
clear answer. In Clark, the defendant argued that the prosecutor took
inconsistent positions as to which of the two defendants was the actual
shooter, basing the inconsistent positions on contradictory evidence
adduced from the state's medical expert. Although the court did cite
to its earlier opinion in Beathard v. Johnson150 for the proposition that
"a prosecutor can make inconsistent arguments at the separate trials
of co-defendants without violating the due process clause," the court
characterized the claim as one based on suppression of evidence,1 5 '
and failed to discuss or even cite any of the inconsistent theories cases
discussed above. The court's opinion can also be read as rejecting the
defendant's claim on the facts-because the expert's testimony was
"essentially consistent," or because the inconsistency did not make a
different result more likely-rather than as a holding that, as a matter
of law, the defendant had no claim. 1'5 2
143. Id.
144. 974 F.2d 1562 (l1th Cir. 1992).
145. Id. at 1578.
146. 248 F.3d 1036 (l1th Cir. 2001).
147. See id. at 1044.
148. Id.
149. 227 F.3d 273 (5th Cir. 2000).
150. 177 F.3d 340, 348 (5th Cir. 1999). See infra pp. 30-31.
151. Referring to the claim as one made under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
See Clark, 227 F.3d at 278-80.
152. See Clark, 227 F.3d at 279-80.
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When the inconsistent theories are the product of the prosecu-
tor's arguments in the separate trials, rather than her manipulation of
the evidence ("inconsistency by inference"), the rule in two circuits
seems to be that there is no due process violation. The case most
clearly making this distinction is the Eleventh Circuit's decision in
Parker v. Singletary.153 In Parker, prosecutors had used the paucity of
evidence as to who shot the victim to argue, in the separate murder
trials of three co-defendants, that the particular defendant on trial was
the actual shooter. The court found no problem with this approach:
Given the uncertainty of the evidence, it was proper for the prose-
cutors in the other co-defendants' cases to argue alternate theories
as to the facts of the murder. The issue of whether the particular
defendant on trial physically committed the murder was an appro-
priate question for each of the co-defendants' juries. t 54
The Fifth Circuit, in Beathard v. Johnson,155 a case in which each defen-
dant pointed the finger at the other, adopted the same reasoning
used by the Eleventh Circuit in Parker
The record from Beathard's trial reveals that the jury heard
Beathard's version of the facts (that he remained outside, while
Hathorn went into the trailer) and Hathorn's version of the facts
(that Hathorn shot through the window and Beathard entered the
trailer.) Price [the prosecutor] presented essentially the same two
versions of the facts at Hathorn's trial, with the exception that he
cross-examined Hathorn concerning whether or not he entered
the trailer, rather than presenting Beathard's live testimony to that
effect. Hathorn denied it, and stuck to his story presented in
Beathard's trial. Price's questions do not amount to evidence.
Beathard emphasizes the fact that Price adopted one theory of the
case in closing argument at Beathard's trial and a different theory
in closing argument at Hathorn's trial. Again, closing arguments
are not evidence. Moreover, a prosecutor can make inconsistent
arguments at the separate trials of co-defendants without violating
the due process clause.1 5 6
The court then went on to hold that Beathard could not claim that
the prosecutor knowingly used false evidence (even though one of the
two versions of the facts was necessarily false) because the prosecutor
had no way of knowing which was the false version.1 57
153. 974 F.2d 1562 (lth Cir. 1992).
154. Id. at 1578.
155. 177 F.3d 340 (5th Cir. 1999).
156. Id. at 348.
157. See id. The Fifth Circuit also rejected an inconsistent theories claim in United States
v. Sharpe, 193 F.3d 852, 872 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that the prosecutor was entitled to
change theories because of the discovery of "new significant evidence") (quoting Thomp-
son v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045,1058 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 523
U.S. 538 (1998)).
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This distinction-between cases in which the prosecutor argues
inconsistently based on different evidence at the separate trials, and
cases in which the prosecutor argues inconsistently based on similar
evidence at the separate trials-has little to commend it. The Parker
court, which made the distinction, offered no analysis beyond the
statement that, "[t]he issue of whether the particular defendant on
trial physically committed the murder was an appropriate question for
each of the co-defendants' juries,"158 and a citation to United States v.
McKeon 159 for the proposition that the prosecutor's arguments should
not be admitted in evidence.1 60 The Beathard court's explanation (set
forth above) consisted of nothing more than an ipse dixit. None of the
commentators have drawn such a distinction, 161 and there is no obvi-
The inconsistent theories issue also was raised in the First Circuit in United States v.
Kattar, 840 F.2d 118 (1st Cir. 1988), but in a very different context. While the court in
Kattar stated that it was "trouble[ed]" and "disturb[ed] to see the Justice Department
change the color of its stripes to such a significant degree," id. at 127, ultimately the court
avoided deciding whether such conduct violated due process because it found that the
defendant had suffered no prejudice, see id. at 129.
The state courts, on various grounds, have all found no due process violation from the
prosecutor's use of inconsistent theories in capital cases. See State v. Lavalais, 685 So. 2d
1048, 1056-57 (La. 1996) (holding that although the prosecutor introduced slightly incon-
sistent evidence in the penalty phases of the defendant's trial and the co-defendant's trial,
the state's emphasis on the culpability of each defendant at their separate trials was appro-
priate and therefore did not violate due process); Carr v. State, 655 So. 2d 824, 834-35
(Miss. 1995) (allowing the State to argue inconsistent theories when prosecuting different
individuals, and finding no due process violation where exculpatory evidence introduced
in the co-defendant's trial was excluded in the defendant's trial); State v. Flowers, 489
S.E.2d 391, 401 (N.C. 1997) (concluding that because the State's evidence was "essentially
the same in both trials," showing that all four defendants were equally culpable, the prose-
cutor's differing arguments were fair and accurate interpretations of the evidence); Little-
john v. State, 989 P.2d 901, 908-09 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998) (holding that where there was
no physical evidence demonstrating who fired the fatal shot, and eyewitness testimony was
contradictory, the prosecutor's use of alternative theories did not violate the defendant's
due process rights); State v. Mak, 718 P.2d 407, 414-15 (Wash. 1986) (finding no due
process violation where the prosecutor argued reasonable and slightly inconsistent infer-
ences from consistent evidence and where both defendants could have been convicted
under either prosecution theory).
The state courts also have rejected due process claims based on inconsistent theories
in non-capital cases. See State v. Pascual, 735 So. 2d 98, 103 (La. Ct. App. 1999); Common-
wealth v. Rosado, 562 N.E.2d 790, 796 (Mass. 1990); State v. Carter, 71 S.W. 3d 267, 272-73
(Mo. Ct. App. 2002); State v. Roach, 680 A.2d 634, 640-41 (N.J. 1996); State v. Ng, 713
P.2d 63, 71 (Wash. 1985).
158. 974 F.2d at 1578.
159. 738 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1984).
160. See 974 F.2d at 1578 n.97 (citing to McKeon, 738 F.2d at 33). The court's reliance
on McKeon is curious since the Second Circuit, in a later case, recognized the right of a
defendant to introduce the prosecutor's prior inconsistent arguments. See United States v.
GAF Corp., 928 F.2d 1253, 1260 (2d Cir. 1991).
161. See, e.g., Poulin, supra note 21, at 1465-71; English, supra note 68, at 551-58.
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ous reason why one form of inconsistent argument is more objectiona-
ble than the other. While it might be suggested that the use of
different evidence is a greater threat to a fair trial because it makes it
more likely that each jury will accept the prosecutor's argument, it
might just as plausibly be suggested that the use of different evidence
is less pernicious because the defendant in that situation can respond
by introducing the prosecutor's "other" evidence, thereby exposing
the prosecutor's inconsistency. At bottom, all versions of the inconsis-
tent theories problem involve the same misconduct-the prosecutor's
use of different evidence or the ambiguities of the evidence to con-
vince the factfinder of a "truth" that she, herself, does not find con-
vincing-and, given the prosecutor's inherent authority, pose the
same risk to a fair trial. Accordingly, the prosecutor's use of inconsis-
tent theories, in whatever form, should constitute a due process viola-
tion whenever the defendant can establish materiality, i.e., that had
the factfinder heard the supporting evidence and the prosecutor's ar-
gument from the "other" case, there was a reasonable likelihood of a
different result.
B. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
In the thirty years since first applying the Eighth Amendment to
overturn a death penalty in Furman v. Georgia,162 the Supreme Court
repeatedly has reaffirmed that the Eighth Amendment has a special
role to play in capital cases.1 63 This understanding is derived from the
premise that, as a penalty, "death is different."
Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a
100-year prison term differs from one of only a year or two. Be-
cause of that qualitative difference, there is a corresponding differ-
ence in the need for reliability in the determination that death is
the appropriate punishment in a specific case. 164
The vice of the death penalty schemes held unconstitutional in
Furman was that they failed to limit the risk that the death penalty
would be arbitrarily applied, 165 and the Court repeatedly has held
that, in order to minimize that risk, death judgments must meet a
162. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
163. See, e.g., Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 584 (1988); Beck v. Alabama, 447
U.S. 625, 637-38 (1980).
164. Beck, 447 U.S. at 638 n.13 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305
(1976)).




heightened standard of reliability. 166 While at times individual justices
have questioned this principle, 167 virtually every justice to sit on the
Court since Furman eventually has accepted it.1 68 Although the con-
cern for the reliability of death judgments was raised first with regard
to the jury's penalty decision, 69 the heightened reliability standard
subsequently was applied to the jury's death eligibility decision (the
finding of aggravating circumstances) 170 and to the jury's guilt/inno-
cence determination. 17 1
Despite the Court's numerous references to the Eighth Amend-
ment's heightened reliability standard and the Court's occasional reli-
ance on the standard to set aside death verdicts, the Court has not
developed a coherent Eighth Amendment doctrine. 172 Nevertheless,
three aspects of the Eighth Amendment's heightened reliability stan-
dard appear to be well established and are significant for purposes of
166. See Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 732 (1998) ("Because the death penalty is
unique 'in both its severity and its finality,' we have recognized an acute need for reliability
in capital sentencing proceedings.") (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357
(1997)); McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 442 (1990) (emphasizing the distinction
between constitutional requirements in capital and non-capital sentencing procedures);
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305 ("Because of [the] qualitative difference [between life and death
as punishments] there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the deter-
mination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.").
167. See Gardner, 430 U.S. at 371 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The prohibition of the
Eighth Amendment relates to the character of the punishment, and not to the process by
which it is imposed."); Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 670 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) ("[T] the Eighth Amendment's prohibition is
directed against cruel and unusual punishments. It does not, by its terms, regulate the proce-
dures of sentencing as opposed to the substance of punishment.").
168. See, e.g., Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 3, 8-9 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., writing
for himself and White, O'Connor, and Scalia, JJ.) ("The finality of the death penalty re-
quires 'a greater degree of reliability' when it is imposed.") (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438
U.S. 586, 604 (1978)); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983) (O'Connor, J.,
writing for herself, Burger, C.J., and White, Powell, and Rehnquist,JJ.) ("The Court, as well
as the separate opinions of a majority of the individual Justices, has recognized that the
qualitative difference of death from all other punishments requires a correspondingly
greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination.").
169. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 305.
170. SeeJohnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 584 (1988).
171. See Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638 (1980).
172. Professors Steiker and Steiker have argued:
It should be apparent... that the doctrine does not reflect a systematic effort to
regulate the death penalty process so much as a series of responses to particular
circumstances in which the Court deemed a state rule or practice manifestly unre-
liable or unfair .... As a result, the Court appears to invoke the death-is-different
principle on a case-by-case basis without a more general theory of the fundamen-
tal prerequisites to a fair and principled death penalty scheme.
Carol S. Steiker and Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of
Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 HARV. L. REv. 355, 397-98 (1995).
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the present discussion. First, the heightened standard of reliability ap-
plied in death penalty cases affords greater protections to the defen-
dant than the due process protections applicable in all criminal
cases. 173 The point is illustrated by the Court's decisions in Beck v.
Alabama174 and Turner v. Murray.175 In Beck, the Court invoked the
"death is different" principle and the heightened reliability standard
to hold that, in a capital case, a defendant is entitled to lesser in-
cluded offense instructions at the guilt phase of the trial.176 The Court
observed that it had "never held that a defendant is entitled to a lesser
included offense instruction as a matter of due process."' 77 In Turner,
the issue was whether a black defendant charged with an interracial
murder was entitled to voir dire prospective jurors on racial
prejudice. 178 The Court earlier had held that the failure to permit
such voir dire in a non-capital case did not violate due process. 79 In
Turner, the Court again invoked the heightened reliability standard
and held that a defendant charged with an interracial murder was en-
titled to such voir dire of the jury that would decide on the penalty.180
This distinction between Eighth Amendment requirements and due
process requirements was also made in Sawyer v. Smith,' 8' where the
Court, in the context of denying relief to the habeas petitioner under
the due process clause, distinguished between the protections af-
forded by the due process clause and the "more particular guarantees
of sentencing reliability based on the Eighth Amendment."' 82
173. In Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972), the Court upheld the Eighth
Amendment challenge to the then-existing death penalty schemes only a year after re-
jecting a similar challenge based on the Due Process Clause. Compare McGautha v. Califor-
nia, 402 U.S. 183, 196 (1971).
174. 447 U.S. 625 (1980).
175. 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
176. See 447 U.S. at 638.
177. Id. at 636. The Court also stated: "We need not and do not decide whether the
Due Process Clause would require the giving of such instructions in a noncapital case." Id.
at 638 n.14.
178. See 476 U.S. at 29.
179. See Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 598 (1976).
180. See 476 U.S. at 36-37.
181. 497 U.S. 227, 235 (1990).
182. Id. Sawyer had sought relief on federal habeas corpus on the ground that the
prosecutor's penalty phase argument violated the Eighth Amendment, see id. at 232, and
he relied on the Court's decision in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 (1985),
which held unconstitutional a death sentence based on a similar argument. The Court
refused to consider the merits of Sawyer's Eighth Amendment argument because his con-
viction had become final prior to the Court's holding in Caldwel4 see Sawyer, 497 U.S. at
232, and, under the authority of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989), a federal habeas
petitioner cannot state a claim for relief based on retroactive application of a new rule. See
Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 234. Sawyer therefore was obliged to make his challenge to the prosecu-
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Second, although the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment relia-
bility standard was at one time described as only requiring "super due
process" in capital cases,183 the focus of the standard has been not
only on the fairness of the process, but also on the reliability of the
outcome, and the reliability is not judged by looking at the particular
case in isolation, but may require examination of other cases or of
post-case developments. The Furman decision itself was not based on
an examination of the fairness of Furman's trial or sentence, but on
the apparent risk of an arbitrary sentence given the size of the death-
eligible pool and the relative infrequency with which the death pen-
alty was imposed. 184 In Herrera v. Collins185 (a case in which the justices
assumed that Herrera had received a fair trial) Herrera raised an "ac-
tual innocence" claim based on newly discovered evidence.' 8 6 Al-
though the Court (6-3) affirmed the denial of relief, a majority of the
justices were willing to assume that an Eighth Amendment claim
would lie upon a truly compelling showing of innocence even for a
defendant who had received a fair trial.187
The key case, for present purposes, is Johnson v. Mississippi.'88 In
Johnson, the defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to
death on the basis of a jury finding of three aggravating circum-
stances, including that he had been "previously convicted of a felony
involving the use or threat of violence to . . . another person," an
assault with intent to commit rape conviction in New York.' 89 After
the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the death sentence, the de-
fendant succeeded in having the New York conviction set aside by the
New York Court of Appeals.190 On appeal from the denial of post-
conviction relief, the Supreme Court held unanimously that allowing
a death sentence to stand based in part on an aggravating circum-
stance subsequently determined to be invalid would violate the Eighth
tor's argument under the Due Process Clause, and he could not show that the argument
"so infec[ted] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due
process." 497 U.S. at 235 (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974)).
183. Margaret Jane Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons: Super Due Process for
Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143 (1980) (disagreeing with the Court's early process-oriented
approach).
184. SeeGregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188-89 (1976) (explaining the Court's holding
in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
185. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
186. See id. at 393.
187. See id. at 419 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 429 (White, J., concurring in the
judgment); id. at 435 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
188. 486 U.S. 578 (1988).
189. Id. at 581.
190. See id. at 581-82.
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Amendment. 19 1 Although there was no claim that the defendant was
denied due process at his trial or that the death judgment was invalid
when entered, the "special need for reliability in the determination
that death is the appropriate punishment"'192 meant that a post-case
event calling into question the accuracy of the information presented
to the jury could invalidate a death judgment.
Third, the Court has recognized that the reliability of a death
judgment may be undermined as much by a prosecutor's argument as
by dubious evidence. In Caldwell v. Mississippi,'93 the Court held that
the prosecutor's argument suggesting that the responsibility for the
death sentence would rest not with the jury, but with the appellate
court, made the resulting death judgment unreliable. In South Caro-
lina v. Gathers,19 4 the Court, relying on its decision in Booth v. Mary-
land 95 that the introduction of victim impact evidence during the
penalty phase violated the Eighth Amendment, held that the prosecu-
tor's discussion of victim impact in the course of his argument, even
without the introduction of victim impact evidence, also led to an un-
reliable death verdict and violated the Eighth Amendment. 9 6
Can a conviction and death sentence based on a version of the
facts which the prosecutor herself disavows in another prosecution
meet a heightened reliability standard? It would seem to be self-evi-
dent that where the inconsistency affects the guilt phase (the guilt or
special circumstances verdicts) and especially where the prosecutor's
alternate version of the facts has evidentiary support-i.e., the cases
involve inconsistency by commission or inconsistency by omission as
to the trial where evidence was omitted-the death judgment cannot
be reliable. The fact that the prosecutor, who knows the case better
than any factfinder did, could not, with any confidence, determine
which version of the facts was correct is the most telling impeachment
of the verdict. Even where the inconsistency is not created by an ar-
191. See id. at 584.
192. Id. (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 363-64 (1977), in turn quoting
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (White, J., concurring in the
judgment)).
193. 472 U.S. 320, 323 (1985).
194. 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
195. 482 U.S. 496, 501-02 (1987).
196. See Gathers, 490 U.S. at 811. ("'While in this case it was the prosecutor rather than
the victim's survivors who characterized the victim's personal qualities, the statement is
indistinguishable in any relevant respect from that in Booth.") Both Booth and Gathers were
overruled in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991), where the Court held that "if the
State chooses to permit the admission of victim impact evidence and prosecutorial argu-
ment on that subject, the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar."
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guably false evidentiary record, but only by the prosecutor's argu-
ment-inconsistency by omission as to the case with the more
complete version of the facts or inconsistency by inference-there still
would seem to be a substantial risk of an unreliable death judgment.
In Caldwell, the Supreme Court recognized that a prosecutor's argu-
ment alone may undermine the reliability of a death verdict.197 If a
prosecutor's argument that diminishes the jury's sense of responsibil-
ity for its verdict violates the Eighth Amendment, surely an argument
that asks a jury to accept facts that the prosecutor herself has already
disclaimed or will thereafter disclaim also violates the Eighth
Amendment. 198
III. State Law and Inconsistent Theories
In addition to federal constitutional challenges, the prosecutor's
use of, or attempt to use, inconsistent factual theories against co-de-
fendants in capital cases also may be challenged under one or more of
three California law doctrines: (1) the use of inconsistent theories
may constitute prosecutorial misconduct invalidating a conviction; 199
(2) judicial estoppel may bar the prosecutor from taking inconsistent
positions; and (3) the prosecutor's argument in one case may be ad-
missible as a party admission in the other case.
A. Prosecutorial Misconduct Under California Law
The California Supreme Court has regularly described
prosecutorial misconduct under California law as consisting of "the
use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade ei-
ther the court or the jury."20 0 The court has yet to define what con-
duct is "deceptive" or "reprehensible," but it is clear that the standard
197. See Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 323.
198. The logic of this argument might suggest that inconsistent verdicts alone, regard-
less of whether the prosecutor has caused that result through the use of inconsistent theo-
ies, should be enough to call into question the reliability of a death judgment. In fact, the
Supreme Court never has upheld inconsistent verdicts in the context of a capital case.
Nevertheless, the two situations are distinguishable because jury discretion (which may
produce inconsistencies) is a necessary and desirable aspect of our criminal justice system,
while prosecutorial manipulation-the deliberate attempt to produce inconsistent re-
sults-is not.
199. This standard for granting relief is lower than the "fundamentally unfair" stan-
dard under the due process clause. See People v. Smithy, 978 P.2d 1171, 1184 (Cal. 1999);
People v. Hill, 952 P.2d 673, 681 (Cal. 1998).
200. Hill, 952 P.2d at 681 (quoting People v. Espinoza, 838 P.2d 204, 211 (Cal. 1992)).
See People v. Samayoa, 938 P.2d 2, 33 (Cal. 1997); People v. Strickland, 523 P.2d 672, 677
(Cal. 1974).
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is an objective one and that the defendant claiming prosecutorial mis-
conduct does not need to prove the prosecutor acted in bad faith, nor
can the prosecutor's showing of good faith defeat the claim:201 "We
observe that the term prosecutorial "misconduct" is somewhat of a
misnomer to the extent that it suggests a prosecutor must act with a
culpable state of mind. A more apt description of the transgression is
prosecutorial error."202 The focus of the inquiry is on whether the
defendant was injured by the misconduct: 203 "What is crucial to a
claim of prosecutorial misconduct is not the good faith vel non of the
prosecutor, but the potential injury to the defendant."20 4 The defen-
dant is entitled to relief if there is a reasonable probability that, but
for the misconduct, the defendant - would have obtained a more
favorable result.20 5
As is discussed above, 20 6 the prosecutor's use of inconsistent fac-
tual theories in trials of co-defendants regularly has been labeled as
"misconduct." Whether or not such conduct is "reprehensible," it
clearly is a "deceptive" method designed to persuade the triers of fact.
The prosecutor is being deceptive when she creates a different eviden-
tiary record in the two cases and fails to advise the factfinder of the
inconsistent evidence (inconsistency by commission and inconsistency
by omission in the case with the less complete record). However, the
prosecutor also is deceptive when she argues for inconsistent findings
and fails to disclose that she has argued, or intends to argue, for the
opposite findings in the co-defendant's case (inconsistency by omis-
sion in the case with the more complete record and inconsistency by
inference).
Where the prosecutor uses inconsistent theories at the guilt
phase, there is a reasonable probability that but for the prosecutor's
deception-her failure to disclose her use of conflicting evidence
and/or argument-the defendant would obtain a more favorable re-
sult. For example, had the prosecutor in Sanchez presented the
factfinder with both the evidence that Sanchez was the aider and abet-
tor, and the evidence that Reyes, not Sanchez, was the aider and abet-
201. See People v. Bolton, 589 P.2d 396, 398 (Cal. 1979).
202. Hill, 952 P.2d at 684.
203. See Bolton, 589 P.2d at 398 ("[lnjury to appellant is nonetheless an injury because
it was committed inadvertently rather than intentionally.") (quoting Note, The Nature and
Consequences of Forensic Misconduct in the Prosecution of a Criminal Case, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
946, 975 (1954)).
204. People v. Benson, 802 P.2d 330, 353 (Cal. 1990).
205. See People v. Haskett, 640 P.2d 776, 791 (Cal. 1982).
206. See discussion supra Part I.B.
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tor, no reasonable jury could have found Sanchez guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Where the inconsistency only affects the penalty
phase, the situation is not quite so clear because of the wider range of
evidence that can be introduced at the penalty phase and the jury's
unbridled discretion in using that evidence to decide on the penalty.
For example, in the Bonner/Allison cases, if Allison's jury had heard
Bonner's confession that he was the actual killer and the prosecutor's
argument (made in Bonner) that the confession should be believed,
would that have saved Allison from the death penalty? As noted above,
the fact that the defendant was not the actual killer is powerful miti-
gating evidence and should overcome all but the worst aggravating
circumstances, but a court would still have to determine its likely ef-
fect in light of all the other evidence introduced at the penalty phase.
Thus, in virtually all cases of guilt phase inconsistent theories and in
most cases of penalty phase inconsistent theories, the defendant
should be entitled to relief under the California standard.
B. Judicial Estoppel
The doctrine of judicial estoppel, as the Supreme Court recently
explained, requires that, "[w]here a party assumes a certain position
in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that position, he
may not thereafter, simply because his interests have changed, assume
a contrary position .... -207 The purpose of the doctrine is to protect
the integrity of the judicial process by "prohibiting parties from delib-
erately changing positions according to the exigencies of the mo-
ment."208 Intentionally pursuing inconsistent theories is said to be
207. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749 (2001) (quoting Davis v. Wakelee,
156 U.S. 680, 689 (1895)). See generally JAMES WM. MOORE, 18 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 134.30 (3d ed. 1998) (explaining the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel).
Judicial estoppel should not be confused (as has been done by some litigants and
commentators) with the more familiar doctrine of collateral estoppel. In fact, although
both doctrines have in common that they bind the litigant to the position taken in the first
litigation, the doctrines are complementary. Whereas collateral estoppel bars a party who
loses on a factual issue in one proceeding from attempting again to prove the same fact in a
second proceeding, see United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 705 (1993) (holding that
collateral estoppel may bar a later prosecution "where the Government has lost an earlier
prosecution involving the same facts"), judicial estoppel bars a party who prevailed on a
factual issue in one proceeding from attempting to prove a different, and inconsistent, fact
in the second proceeding, see New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 751 ("[J]udicial estoppel forbids
use of intentional self-contradiction... as a means of obtaining unfair advantage.") (quot-
ing Scarano v. Central R.R., 203 F.2d 510, 513 (3rd Cir. 1953)).
208. New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750 (quoting United States v. McCaskey, 9 F.3d 368,
378 (5th Cir. 1993)). See also Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 690 F.2d 595, 599 (6th Cir.
1982) ("The essential function ofjudicial estoppel is to prevent intentional inconsistency;
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"playing fast and loose with the courts." 20 9 The party invoking the doc-
trine must establish that the opposing party's positions are truly incon-
sistent, but the inconsistent position does not have to be based on
sworn testimony. "[E]ven when the prior statements were not made
under oath, the doctrine may be invoked to prevent a party from play-
ing fast and loose with the courts."2 10 The courts are divided over
whether the party to be estopped has to have prevailed in the first
litigation for judicial estoppel to be invoked. The majority of federal
circuit courts recognizing the doctrine hold that it is inapplicable un-
less the inconsistent statement was actually adopted by the court in
the earlier litigation. 21' A party need not prevail on the merits to show
that the court adopted the prior inconsistent statement; rather it is
sufficient that the prior court "accepted" the position. 212 In contrast,
the minority view holds that the doctrine can be applied even if the
party was "unsuccessful in asserting the inconsistent position, if by his
change of position he is playing 'fast and loose' with the court .... "213
Whetherjudicial estoppel may be applied against the government
and, in particular, against the prosecutor in a criminal case has not
been clearly resolved. For example, in Heckler v. Community Heath Ser-
vices,214 the Supreme Court considered whether estoppel (in that case
equitable estoppel) could run against the government and could only
conclude that there may be circumstances where "the public interest
the object of the rule is to protect the judiciary, as an institution, from the perversion of
judicial machinery."); Mark J. Plumer, Note Judicial Estoppel: The Refurbishing of a Judicial
Shield, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 409, 410 (1987) ("The doctrine evolved from the judiciary's
recognition that the integrity of a trial is intolerably tainted when an unscrupulous litigant
deliberately reverses his factual position from one trial to another and in the process forces
a court, cognizant of the contradiction, to disregard the factual position previously relied
upon.").
209. Russell v. Rolfs, 893 F.2d 1033, 1037 (9th Cir. 1990); Allen v. Zurich Ins. Co., 667
F.2d 1162, 1166 (4th Cir. 1982); Scarano, 203 F.2d at 519.
210. Konstantinidis v. Chen, 626 F.2d 933, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting in part
Scarano, 203 F.2d at 513).
211. See, e.g., Edwards, 690 F.2d at 599; Allen, 667 F.2d at 1167; Kingsport v. Steel & Roof
Structure, Inc., 500 F.2d 617, 620 (6th Cir. 1974). The Ninth Circuit "has not yet had
occasion to decide whether to follow the 'majority' view or the 'minority' view." Rissetto v.
Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 1996).
212. See, e.g., Konstantinidis, 626 F.2d at 937 n.6; Parkinson v. California Co., 233 F.2d
432, 438 (10th Cir. 1956); USLIFE Corp. v. United States Life Ins. Co., 560 F.Supp. 1302,
1305 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
213. Yanez v. Broco, 989 F.2d 323, 326 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Morris v. California,
966 F.2d 448, 453 (9th Cir. 1991) (describing the minority view)). See, e.g., Patriot Cinemas,
Inc. v. General Cinema Corp., 834 F.2d 208, 215 (1st Cir. 1987) (requiring plaintiff to
conform to earlier representation that it would not pursue antitrust suit).
214. 467 U.S. 51 (1984).
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in ensuring that the Government can enforce the law free from estop-
pel might be outweighed by the countervailing interest of citizens in
some minimum standard of decency, honor, and reliability in their
dealings with their Government."215 The Ninth Circuit has applied the
doctrine ofjudicial estoppel against the government in the context of
a habeas corpus challenge to a criminal conviction. In Russell v.
Rofs, 216 the court held that the doctrine prohibited the State of Wash-
ington from arguing that a criminal defendant's habeas petition was
barred by a state court procedural default, after the State had success-
fully argued in the district court that the original petition should be
dismissed because the petitioner had an adequate remedy in state
court.2 1 7 The court noted that:
A state under these circumstances misleads a district court by men-
tioning only that portion of its views that favors the immediate re-
sult it seeks, and .... [therefore the] state prevailed by telling the
state court the opposite of what it told the federal court. The pro-
position that the state can be estopped from relying on the advan-
tage it gained by doing so seems unremarkable. 2 18
There is little law on the question of whether judicial estoppel can be
applied against the prosecutor in a criminal case. 219 Decisions in the
First and Fifth Circuits have noted that the doctrine generally has not
been applied against a prosecutor. 220 On the other hand, decisions in
the Seventh and Ninth Circuits have assumed that judicial estoppel is
215. Id. at 60-61. See Office of Personnel Mgmt. v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414, 419-24
(1990) (reviewing Supreme Court equitable estoppel cases and noting that whether equita-
ble estoppel could be applied to the government when the government was guilty of af-
firmative misconduct was an open question). See also Kowalczyk v. INS., 245 F.3d 1143,
1149-50 (10th Cir. 2001); Murphy v. Hood, 276 F.3d 475, 477 (9th Cir. 2001).
216. 893 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1990).
217. See id. at 1038-39.
218. Id. at 1038.
219. In fact there is more law on the issue of whether judicial estoppel can be applied
against a defendant in a criminal case. See, e.g., Lowery v. Stovall, 92 F.3d 219, 225 (4th Cir.
1996) (upholding a district court decision that the doctrine of judicial estoppel precluded
the defendant from arguing, in contradiction of his guilty plea, that he did not maliciously
attack the victim); Morris v. State, 966 F.2d 448, 453 (9th Cir. 1992) (declining to invoke
the doctrine of judicial estoppel against a defendant where "its use would serve to keep a
conviction in effect regardless of the innocence or guilt of defendant"); State v. Washing-
ton, 419 N.W.2d 275, 277 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (finding that the doctrine of judicial estop-
pel prohibited the defendant from inconsistently arguing that he was entitled to a
mistrial).
220. See United States v. McCaskey, 9 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting thatjudicial
estoppel "has apparently never been applied" in criminal cases); United States v. Kattar,
840 F.2d 118, 129-30 n.7 (1st Cir. 1988) (stating that "this obscure doctrine has never been
applied against the government in a criminal proceeding").
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applicable against the prosecutor, but have declined to apply it on the
facts of the particular cases. 221
In California, the Supreme Court has held that equitable estop-
pel can be applied against the government if "the injustice which
would result from a failure to uphold an estoppel is of a sufficient
dimension to justify any effect upon public interest or policy which
would result from the . . . estoppel." 222 Meanwhile, the Court of Ap-
peal has developed and applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel in a
series of cases. 223 The court has said that the purpose of the doctrine
is to prevent litigants from "playing fast and loose with the courts"224
and that its "essential function and justification ... is to prevent the
use of intentional self-contradiction as a means of obtaining unfair
advantage in a forum provided for suitors seeking justice.' "2 25 "One to
whom two inconsistent courses of action are open and who elects to
pursue one of them is afterward precluded from pursuing the
other."226 In Jackson v. County of Los Angeles, 227 the court laid down the
test applied in subsequent cases. Judicial estoppel applies when:
(1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were
taken in judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings; (3)
the party was successful in asserting the first position (i.e., the tri-
bunal adopted the position or accepted it as true); (4) the two posi-
221. See United States v. Hook, 195 F.3d 299, 307 (7th Cir. 1999) (considering judicial
estoppel against the government in a criminal case but declining to apply it because the
government's present position was not inconsistent with its former position); United States
v. Garcia, 37 F.3d 1359, 1367 (9th Cir. 1994) (considering judicial estoppel against the
government but upholding the district court's finding that judicial estoppel was not appro-
priate because there was not a true inconsistency).
Some state courts have reached the same result. See State v. Towery, 920 P.2d 290, 304,
306 (Ariz. 1996) (stating that "the doctrine of judicial estoppel is no less applicable in a
criminal than in a civil trial," but declining to apply it to the facts of the case.); People v.
Gayfield, 633 N.E.2d 919, 925 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (suggesting that the state would be es-
topped from inconsistently claiming in separate proceedings that different defendants shot
the same victim).
222. City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 476 P.2d 423, 448 (Cal. 1970).
223. See, e.g., Drain v. Betz Lab. Inc., 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 864, 871 (Ct. App. 1999);Jackson
v. County of Los Angeles, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 96, 103 (Ct. App. 1997); Prilliman v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 142, 156 (Ct. App. 1997).
224. Int'l Engine Parts, Inc. v. Feddersen & Co., 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 178, 181 (Ct. App.
1998). See also Thomas v. Gordon, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 28, 32 (Ct. App. 2000) ('Judicial estop-
pel is an equitable doctrine aimed at preventing fraud on the courts.") (quoting Drain, 81
Cal. Rptr. 2d at 868, in turn quoting In re Marriage of Dekker, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 642, 646
(Ct. App. 1993)).
225. Drain, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 867.
226. Schulze v. Schulze, 262 P.2d 646, 650 (Cal. Ct. App. 1953).
227. 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 96 (Ct. App. 1997).
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tions are totally inconsistent; and (5) the first position was not
taken as a result of ignorance, fraud, or mistake.2 28
With regard to the third factor-that the party was successful in assert-
ing the first position-the court went on to say that since judicial es-
toppel is an equitable doctrine, it could not "rule out the possibility
that, in a future case, circumstances may warrant application of the
doctrine even if the earlier position was not adopted by the tribu-
nal."229 Subsequently, in International Engine Parts, Inc. v. Feddersen &
Co.,230 the court held that the doctrine of judicial estoppel should be
invoked notwithstanding that the party's actions were not taken with
an evil motive nor were of consequence to the underlying proceeding.
The court stated that "[r] egardless of whether the motive was pure or
the effects of the falsehood inconsequential, we must expect honesty
and frankness in all judicial and administrative proceedings from par-
ties that choose to bring lawsuits in our courts." 231
As mentioned above,2 32 in People v. Watts, 233 the Court of Appeal
discussed and rejected Watts' claim that his prosecution should have
been barred by judicial estoppel.234 This decision is fundamentally
flawed. Despite the number of California cases addressing the doc-
trine ofjudicial estoppel, the court cited no California authority for its
position, nor did it discuss the policies supporting the rule. Instead,
the court argued three points in support of its decision: (1) that sev-
eral federal courts had said the doctrine had not been applied against
the prosecution;235 (2) that collateral estoppel does not prevent reliti-
gation of an issue decided against a different defendant;23 6 and (3)
that the Washington Supreme Court, in State v. Ng,2 3 7 rejected such a
claim on similar facts.238 As to the court's first point, the fact that sev-
eral federal courts said the doctrine had not been applied while
228. Id. at 103.
229. Id. at 103-04 n.8. See Thomas, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 30-33 (holding that the doctrine
ofjudicial estoppel precluded appellant from attempting to establish that she held interest
in corporations sufficient to require the corporations' accountant to keep her informed of
their financial affairs, even absent proof that a court had adopted her previous position
that she had no assets, in her earlier bankruptcy litigation).
230. 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 178 (Ct. App. 1998).
231. Id. at 183.
232. See discussion supra Part I.C.
233. 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d I (Ct. App. 1999), rev. denied 2000 Cal. LEXIS 1428 (Mosk and
Kennard, JJ. dissenting), cert. denied 531 U.S. 837 (2000).
234. See id. at 9-10.
235. See id. at 9.
236. See id. at 10.
237. 713 P.2d 63 (Wash. 1985).
238. See 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 10.
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others (noted by the Watts court) suggested that it could be applied
says nothing whatsoever about whether this state law doctrine should
be applied by California courts.23 9 The court's second point, that col-
lateral estoppel is not applied where there is no mutuality, is equally
dubious. In People v. Taylor,240 the California Supreme Court did apply
collateral estoppel on behalf of Taylor based on an earlier acquittal of
Taylor's co-defendant, Daniels. Finally, the court's reliance on Ng also
is difficult to understand. The Washington court rejected Ng's claim
because it found that there was no significant inconsistency in the
prosecutor's positions in the two trials. 241 In addition, Ng (unlike
Watts) was tried before his co-defendant, so there would have been no
basis for the application of judicial estoppel in any event.242
Watts aside, there is every reason, under California law, to apply
judicial estoppel to the prosecutor's use of inconsistent factual theo-
ries at successive trials. The situation fits comfortably within the doc-
trine as described in Jackson.243 Jackson's first requirement-that the
same party has taken two or more positions-is, of course, the basis of
the inconsistent theories challenge.2 44 The second requirement-that
both positions were taken in judicial proceedings-is satisfied because
both positions were taken in separate criminal trials. The third re-
quirement-that the party was successful in asserting the first position
(i.e., "the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true"245)-
may be more difficult to establish, particularly where the inconsistency
relates only to the penalty phase,246 but it also is not certain that this
239. The court's discussion of the federal cases is also curious because the court dis-
cusses the Ninth Circuit panel decision in Thompson v. Calderon, 109 F.3d 1358 (9th Cir.
1996), see 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 9, without ever mentioning the superseding en banc decision,
which found the prosecutor's use of inconsistent theories to be misconduct and a violation
of due process. See Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045, 1058 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc)
rev'd on other grounds, 523 U.S. 538 (1998). See also discussion supra pp. 27-28.
240. 527 P.2d 622 (Cal. 1974).
241. See Ng, 713 P.2d at 71.
242. The court later rejected an "inconsistent theories" claim by Ng's accomplice, Mak,
on the ground that there was no inconsistency. See State v. Mak, 718 P.2d 407, 414 (Wash.
1986).
243. SeeJackson v. County of Los Angeles, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d 96, 103 (Ct. App. 1997). See
also discussion supra pp. 42-43.
244. That the prosecutions may have been conducted by different prosecutors is irrele-
vant since both represent the same party, the state. See Russell v. Rolfs, 893 F.2d 1033,
1038-39 n.6 (9th Cir. 1990) ("The fact that the earlier representation was made by the
attorney general's office and the latter by the King County prosecuting attorney is irrele-
vant-they were both speaking for the same party.").
245. Jackson, 70 Cal Rptr. at 103.
246. See discussion supra pp. 38-39.
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requirement must be met.2 4 7 The fourth requirement in Jackson-that
the two positions are totally inconsistent-can be established by exam-
ining the trial transcript from the previous trial. The fifth require-
ment-that the first position was not taken as a result of ignorance,
fraud, or mistake-is really a requirement that the prosecution estab-
lish that its position in the second trial is based on evidence discov-
ered after the first trial.248 Where the prosecutor does seek to avoid
the application of judicial estoppel on the basis of newly discovered
evidence, the prosecutor in effect acknowledges that the first verdict
was wrong. If the court agrees, the court ought to require the prosecu-
tor, as a condition of avoiding the application of an equitable doc-
trine, to "do equity" by stipulating to the setting aside of the first
conviction.2 49 It would be fundamentally inconsistent for the prosecu-
tor to resist application of judicial estoppel on the ground that she is
not acting inequitably by changing theories, while, at the same time,
insisting on preserving a conviction, and perhaps death sentence,
wrongly obtained.
Although the doctrine ofjudicial estoppel should protect the sec-
ond defendant to be tried, what of the first-tried defendant (e.g.,
Thompson, Sanchez, or Waidla), who could not take advantage of the
doctrine because, at the time of his trial and death sentence, the pros-
ecutor had yet to take an inconsistent position? The doctrine of judi-
cial estoppel, itself, offers no basis for relief on appeal for the first-
tried defendant. However, it may have a indirect role to play on state
habeas corpus.250 If the defendant has a habeas claim which turns on
the disputed facts (e.g., actual innocence, prosecutorial misconduct,
or ineffective assistance of counsel), the defendant can take the posi-
tion that the prosecutor is estopped from denying the truth of the
inconsistent (and presumably exonerating or partially exonerating)
factual position she took at the second trial.
247. See Jackson, 70 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 103 n.8. One commentator suggests that in "crimi-
nal cases, judicial estoppel should apply if the prosecution prevailed in a manner that is
consistent with acceptance of the prior position." Poulin, supra note 21, at 1454.
248. The state should not be allowed to argue that although the prosecutor knew of
the evidence to be used in the second prosecution prior to the first trial, it was "ignorant"
of the true facts because, in the end, the evidence was ambiguous. The argument amounts
to nothing more than the assertion that the prosecutor should be permitted to prosecute
both defendants because she is not convinced that either one is actually guilty. Similarly,
where the inconsistency is created not by different evidence, but by a different argument at
the second trial, there can be no justification based on "ignorance, fraud or mistake."
249. See discussion supra note 40.
250. It also may play a role on federal habeas corpus, but, as noted above, considera-
tion of federal habeas corpus is beyond the scope of this article.
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C. Party Admissions
A potential limitation on the prosecutor's use of inconsistent fac-
tual theories in the successive trials of co-defendants is the ability of
the second-tried defendant to introduce the prosecutor's factual the-
ory from the previous trial as an admission of a party-opponent. Gen-
erally, relevant oral or written admissions of a party opponent are
admissible against that party when offered by an opponent, and such
admissions are exempted from the operation of the rule against hear-
say. They constitute substantive evidence rather than mere impeach-
ing statements.251 For a statement to be admitted under this doctrine,
no preliminary foundation need be laid by examining the declarant
about the admission, 252 nor must it be shown that the speaker had
personal knowledge about the subject matter of an admission. 253 The
party-admissions doctrine covers authorized admissions of a party-op-
ponent, and it is well established that attorneys' statements come
within the rule and that attorneys who are employed by a party are
considered to have prima facie authority to make such admissions for
that party.254 Such admissions may be made in pleadings, oral or writ-
ten stipulations, or oral in-court statements representing the factual
contentions of a party, including arguments that counsel make to the
jury.255
Prosecutors' statements in related cases have been admitted as
party admissions in a number of cases in the federal courts.256 State
251. See 3 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE, § 801.15 (5th ed.
2001); 1 B. E. WITKIN & THE WITKIN LEGAL INSTITUTE, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE Hearsay
§§ 90-91 (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter WITKIN].
252. See, e.g., United States v. Kenny, 645 F.2d 1323, 1340 (9th Cir. 1981); United States
v. Cline, 570 F.2d 731, 735 (8th Cir. 1978).
253. See, e.g., Blackburn v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 179 F.3d 81, 96 (3d Cir. 1999)). Of
course such admissions must still meet other requirements for admission, e.g., relevancy.
254. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 259 at 401 Uohn W. Strong, ed., 5th ed. 1999).
255. See id. §§ 257, 259. See also Purgess v. Sharrock, 33 F.3d 134, 143-44 (2d Cir. 1994)
(finding no error in the admission against the defendant of a footnote in a brief filed on
the defendant's behalf by counsel in a related case); United States v. Margiotta, 662 F.2d
131, 142 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting that arguments counsel make to the jury are admissible);
Frank v. Bloom, 634 F.2d 1245, 1251 (10th Cir. 1980) (finding that a lawyer's admission in
pleadings on behalf of a client was an "admission by a party made by his agent acting
within the scope of his employment").
256. See, e.g., United States v. Branham, 97 F.3d 835, 851 (6th Cir. 1996) ("The govern-
ment concedes that Rule 801(d) (2) (D) contemplates that the federal government is a
party-opponent of the defendant in a criminal case .... "); United States v. DeLoach, 34
F.3d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that a prosecutor's closing statements in related
cases were admissible in subsequent trial if they were (1) "assertions of fact" that are the
"equivalent of a testimonial statement"; and (2) "inconsistent with similar assertions in a
subsequent trial") (quoting United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26, 33 (2d Cir. 1984));
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courts also have recognized the applicability of the party admissions
doctrine in criminal cases. 257 The Second Circuit, in United States v.
GAF Corp.,25 8 summed up the reasons for allowing the defendant to
introduce such evidence:
[T] he jury is at least entitled to know that the government at one
time believed, and stated, that its proof established something dif-
ferent from what it currently claims. Confidence in the justice sys-
tem cannot be affirmed if any party is free, wholly without
explanation, to make a fundamental change in its version of the
facts between trials, and then conceal this change from the final
trier of the facts. 259
California recognizes the doctrine of party admissions, 260 and ap-
plies the doctrine to statements made by attorneys about their repre-
United States v. Orena, 32 F.3d 704, 716 (2d Cir. 1994) (allowing defense to "introduce a
prosecutor's statement from a prior trial when: (1) the prosecution offered an inconsistent
assertion of fact at the prior trial; and (2) the prosecutor can offer no 'innocent' explana-
tion for the contradiction"); United States v. Salerno, 937 F.2d 797, 811-12 (2d Cir. 1991)
(stating that the jury argument by a prosecutor in related case would be admissible in the
defendant's trial as an admission of a party-opponent); United States v. GAF Corp., 928
F.2d 1253, 1262 (2d Cir. 1991) (finding the prosecutor's prior inconsistent statements re-
garding the theory and facts of the case admissible against the government in a subsequent
trial); United States v. Bakshinian, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1105-06 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (holding
that, because prosecutors have power to bind the government, the prosecutor's statement
during closing argument at the separate trial of the co-defendant was admissible in the
defendant's trial as an admission of a party-opponent). But see United States v. Zizzo, 120
F.3d 1338, 1351-52 n.4 (7th Cir. 1997) (refusing to apply Fed. R. Evid. 801 (d) (2) to state-
ments made by government employees in criminal cases); United States v. Prevatte, 16 F.3d
767, 779 n.9 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that Fed. R. Evid. 801(d) (2) (D) does not apply to
government agents, because no individual can bind the sovereign).
It should be noted that the doctrine of party admissions applies not only to the prose-
cutor's factual assertions, but also to her opinions or contentions. See Bakshinian, 65 F.
Supp. 2d at 1109 (asserting that when the government argues to the jury that the evidence
supports a certain conclusion, although the contention is not "evidence," it is a statement
about the evidence and therefore the government can not argue that it should be ex-
cluded because it is not "evidence" or not "testimonial").
257. See, e.g., State v. Cardenas-Hernandez, 579 N.W.2d 678, 685-86 (Wis. 1998) (rec-
ognizing the doctrine, but declining to apply it on the facts of the case); People v. Cruz,
643 N.E.2d 636, 664-65 (Ill. 1994) (finding that the prosecutor's prior inconsistent argu-
ments regarding where the victim's body was found were admissible under the party-admis-
sions doctrine but declining to find that the trial court abused its discretion in not
admitting evidence of those statements); Hoover v. State, 552 So. 2d 834, 840 (Miss. 1989)
(holding that the prosecutor's prior inconsistent statements regarding who was the actual
gunman were admissible under Mississippi Rule 801 (d ) (2) and exclusion of that evidence
by the trial court was error).
258. 928 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1991).
259. Id. at 1260.
260. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1220 (West 1995) ("Evidence of a statement is not made
inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered against the declarant in an action to which
he is a party in either his individual or representative capacity, regardless of whether the
statement was made in his individual or representative capacity.").
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sentation. 261 As is the case under the Federal Rules, statements
admitted into evidence under this doctrine constitute substantive evi-
dence that the jury or judge considers in relation to the other evi-
dence introduced at trial,26 2 and admissions made in one legal
proceeding, through pleadings or in-court statements, can be admit-
ted as evidence in a subsequent proceeding. 263 Although California
courts have yet to apply the doctrine of party admissions to prosecu-
tors' statements in criminal cases, there is no obvious reason why Cali-
fornia should not follow the majority rule and admit such evidence
assuming that it is relevant and that its probative value outweighs the
possibility of prejudice. In fact, admission of such evidence could be
expected to operate as a powerful deterrent to the prosecutor engag-
ing in the use of inconsistent theories.
Recognition that the party admissions doctrine should be applica-
ble to prosecutors in criminal cases requires some additional observa-
tions. First, like the judicial estoppel doctrine, 264 the party admissions
doctrine generally will be of use only to the defendant who is tried
second since, at the time of the first trial, the prosecutor will not yet
have asserted an inconsistent position. 265 Second, although the doc-
trine is one of state law, recognition that prosecutors' inconsistent
statements may be introduced by a defendant as substantive evidence
carries federal constitutional implications. Because such evidence
could well be material in a given case, i.e., create a reasonable
probability of a different result, the prosecutor should have an obliga-
tion to disclose her inconsistent statements to the second-tried defen-
261. See JUSTICE ARTHUR GILBERT, 1 JEFFERSON'S CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE BENCHBOOK,
§ 3.36 (3d ed. Supp. 2001) (citing Cseri v. D'Amore, 43 Cal. Rptr. 36, 40 (Ct. App. 1965);
see also Dolinar v. Pedone, 146 P.2d 237, 241 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944) ("Attorneys are both
agents and attorneys for their clients in the matters in which they are employed, and are
presumed to obtain the information contained in the pleadings filed by them from their
clients.") (quoting W. Oil Fields Corp. v Nowlin, 288 S.W. 554, 556 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926)).
262. See WITKIN, supra note 251, § 91 (2000) (citing Gates v. Pendleton 236 P. 365, 366
(Cal. Ct. App. 1925)).
263. See Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. East Bay Union Machinists, 39 Cal. Rptr. 64,
83-84 (Ct. App. 1964); Nungaray v. Pleasant Valley Lima Bean Growers & Warehouse
Ass'n, 300 P.2d 285, 293-95 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956); Dolinar v. Pedone, 146 P.2d 237, 241
(Cal. Ct. App. 1944).
264. See discussion supra Part III.B.
265. However, there may be circumstances where the party admissions doctrine could
be used by both defendants. For example, in the Thompson/Leitch cases, although Thomp-
son was tried first, he might have used the doctrine to introduce the prosecutor's inconsis-
tent statements made at the preliminary hearing in the case. In the Scott/Turner cases,
Turner was tried first, but, after he obtained a reversal of his conviction, he was retried
after Scott was tried, so Scott and he both could have used the prosecutor's prior inconsis-
tent statements.
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dant.266 Third, unlike the doctrine of judicial estoppel, the party
admissions doctrine does not prohibit the prosecutor from changing
factual theories at the second trial; it simply permits the defendant to
use the prosecutor's prior theory against the prosecution. Fourth, like
the judicial estoppel doctrine, 267 the party admissions doctrine may
play a role on state habeas corpus, even for the first-tried defendant
who could not use the doctrine at trial, or for the second-tried defen-
dant who did not use the doctrine at trial. If the prosecutor made
admissions tending to exonerate or at least reduce the culpability of
the defendant, evidence of such admissions may be introduced to es-
tablish the constitutional violations alleged by the defendant.
Conclusion
In their Executive Summary to Why There Is So Much Error in Capi-
tal Cases, and What Can Be Done About It,268 a massive study of the oper-
ation of the death penalty system in the United States from 1973 to
1995, the authors state that, "[t] here is growing awareness that seri-
ous, reversible error permeates America's death penalty system, put-
ting innocent lives at risk, heightening the suffering of victims, leaving
killers at large, wasting tax dollars, and failing citizens, the courts and
the justice system."269
The authors found that, during the study period, sixty-eight per-
cent of all death sentences were overturned by the state courts or on
an initial federal habeas petition,270 and that in eighty-two percent of
the cases where the death sentence was overturned, the defendant did
not receive a death sentence on remand.2 71 This flawed system has
sent numerous innocent people to death row. Between 1973 and May
2002, 101 people were released from death row because of evidence
266. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995). ("[T]he prosecution, which alone
can know what is undisclosed, must be assigned the consequent responsibility to gauge the
likely net effect of all such evidence and make disclosure when the point of 'reasonable
probability' is reached."). But see Clark v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 273, 279 (5th Cir. 2000) (find-
ing the prosecutor had no duty to disclose his prior inconsistent position).
267. See discussion supra Part III.B.
268. JAMES S. LIEBMAN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM, PART II: WHY THERE IS So MUCH ERROR
IN CAPITAL CASES, AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT (2002), available at http://www.law.
columbia.edu/brokensystem2/ (last visited May 28, 2002) [hereinafter A BROKEN SYSTEM].
269. Id. at i.
270. See id. at 11. This percentage does not include those sentences overturned by in-
validation of the state's scheme by the Supreme Court. See id. at 18.
271. See id. at 43.
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that they did not commit capital murder.2 72 Lee Farmer was one of
those released, but only after he had spent 18 years on death row. 273
There is also substantial evidence that innocent people have been exe-
cuted.274 Thomas Thompson was probably one of them. 275 The revela-
tions as to the amount of error in the system have generated a range
of responses. Governors in two states, Illinois and Maryland, have de-
clared moratoria on executions because of concerns about the fair-
ness and accuracy of their schemes. 276 A number of other states have
undertaken studies of their death penalties. 277 Recent reports by bi-
partisan commissions have recommended a slew of reforms to over-
haul death penalty practices. 278 At this writing, the federal death
penalty is facing a serious constitutional challenge asserting that the
risk of executing innocents is so great as to render any death sentence
a violation of due process.279
California, the state with the largest death row in the country, is
not immune from committing error in death penalty cases. According
to the Columbia researchers, California had an overall error rate of
eighty-seven percent during the period 1973-1995.280 Such an error
272. See Death Penalty Information Center, Innocence and the Death Penalty, at http:/
/www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/innoc.html (last visited May 28, 2002).
273. See Farmer, 765 P.2d at 940.
274. See generally MICHAEL L. RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE (1992) (conclud-
ing that at least twenty-three innocent people have been executed). EvenJustice O'Connor
has acknowledged such a likelihood, stating, "the system may well be allowing some inno-
cent defendants to be executed." Charles Lane, O'Connor Expresses Death Penalty Doubt,
WASH. POST, June 4, 2001, at Al.
275. See Reinhardt, supra note 16, at 350-51. Interestingly, seven former California
prosecutors had asked the Ninth Circuit to spare Thompson's life because of his probable
innocence and the unfairness of his trial. See Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner
at 45, Thompson v. Calderon, 120 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1997).
276. See Dirk Johnson, Illinois, Citing Faulty Verdicts, Bars Executions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1,
2000, at Al; Henry Weinstein, Maryland Governor Calls Halt to Executions, L.A. TIMES, May 10,
2002, at A6.
277. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA STATE-BY-STATE PROFILES ON MORATORIUM IS-
SUES AND ACTrIVITIES IN CAPITAL JURISDICTIONS, at http://www.abanet.org/irr/deathpen-
alty/states.html (last visited June 3, 2002). States currently reviewing their death penalties
include Connecticut, Indiana and Nevada. States that have completed studies include Ari-
zona, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina and Virginia. States with pending legislation
requiring such studies include Missouri and Oklahoma.
278. See ILL. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, REPORT OF TI-IE GOVER-
NOR'S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (Illinois 2002) [hereinafter ILLINOIS COMMIS-
SION]; THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, MANDATORYJUSTICE: EIGHTEEN REFORMS TO THE DEATH
PENALTY (2001) [hereinafter MANDATORY JUSTICE].
279. See United States v. Quinones, 205 F.Supp. 2d 256, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), incorporat-
ing United States v. Quinones, 196 F.Supp. 2d 416, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that the
federal death penalty is unconstitutional).
280. See A BROKEN SYSTEM, supra note 268, at A-7.
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rate is not surprising because California's death penalty scheme has
most of the flaws which lead to arbitrary and erroneous results. The
state has perhaps the broadest death penalty statute in the country,
and with an overbroad statute comes the inevitable risk of arbitrary
application.2 81 As the six case pairs illustrate, prosecutors rely heavily
on the testimony of notoriously unreliable jailhouse informants in
death penalty cases. 282 California has no system for qualifying attor-
neys to handle death penalty cases at trial, and ineffective assistance of
counsel is perhaps the leading cause of error in death penalty cases.28 3
California is one of a minority of states where its supreme court does
not engage in proportionality review in capital cases, thereby increas-
ing the risk of arbitrariness in application of the death penalty.28 4
In a death penalty system so fraught with error, there should be
no tolerance for prosecutorial conduct which increases the already
high risk of an erroneous conviction or death sentence. The prosecu-
tor's use of inconsistent factual theories in the separate trials of co-
defendants (unless the change in theories results from the discovery
of new evidence) is conduct which serves no legitimate state interest
and creates just such a risk of an erroneous conviction or death sen-
tence. Whether on federal constitutional grounds-because such con-
duct undermines confidence in the judgment or sentence under the
Due Process Clause or fails to meet the heightened reliability standard
281. See generally Steven F. Shatz & Nina Rivkind, The California Death Penalty Scheme:
Requiem for Furman?, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1283 (1997) (arguing that the California death
penalty scheme is unconstitutional for failing to "genuinely narrow" the death-eligible
class). The Illinois Commission unanimously found that the Illinois statute, which is nar-
rower than the California statute, was too broad, and it recommended drastically reducing
the number of death-eligibility factors. See ILLINOIS COMMISSION, supra note 278, at 65-75.
282. See MANDATORY JUSTICE, supra note 278, at 52.
A... category of evidence that has a particularly high chance of being an outright
lie, exaggerated, or otherwise erroneous is the testimony ofjailhouse informants.
Their confinement provides evidence of their questionable character, motivates
them to lie in order to improve the conditions of their confinement or even se-
cure their release, and often affords access to information that can be used to
manufacture credible testimony.
Id.
283. See McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 1256, 1264 (1994) (Blackmun,J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) ("My 24 years of overseeing the imposition of the death penalty from
this Court have left me in grave doubt ...whether the constitutional requirement of
competent legal counsel for capital defendants is being fulfilled."). See also Bilionis & Ro-
sen, supra note 38, at 1304-06 and nn.13-19 (listing articles and judicial opinions "de-
cry[ing] the sorry state of capital lawyering").
284. See A BROKEN SYSTEM, supra note 268, at 486-92 (discussing proportionality re-
view); ILLINOIS COMMISSION, supra note 278, at 166-68 (advocating for greater proportional-
ity review by the Illinois Supreme Court).
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of the Eighth Amendment-or state law grounds-because the prose-
cutor has used "deceptive methods" or is judicially estopped or has
admitted the correctness of her first theory-the time has come for
the courts to prohibit prosecutors from arguing inconsistent factual
theories and thereby playing fast and loose with the courts and the
defendants.
